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The strategy of highway interdiction was created to counter the negative 
consequences of drug trafficking organizations using highways to distribute contraband. 
Although there have been tangible results, the strategy has also resulted in the unintended 
consequences of racial profiling and illegal searches. This thesis addresses whether policy 
safeguards could help minimize improper practices of personnel conducting highway 
interdiction operations.  
This project convened a series of focus groups consisting of 11 state police 
organizations that provided information on policy safeguards and their purposes. This 
thesis examines seven major categories of policy safeguards to determine the level of 
implementation by the state police organizations. In addition, this thesis includes a 
comparative analysis of the implementation of policy safeguards and the number of 
personnel complaints filed to determine whether there is any correlation. Although the 
findings are not conclusive, the analysis identified potential benefits of implementing 
policy safeguards.  
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The primary responsibility of law enforcement organizations in the United States 
is the preservation of life in the communities they serve. This responsibility requires law 
enforcement organizations to deploy resources to identify criminal activity and minimize 
the negative consequences of crime, including, for example, the trade in and use of illegal 
drugs. In 2014, there were 120 deaths each day from drug overdoses in the United 
States.1 The strategy of highway interdiction was created to counter the drug trafficking 
organizations using the highway system to distribute contraband throughout the county.  
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) developed a program, known as 
Operation Pipeline, which provided specialized training for law enforcement personnel 
focusing on identifying individuals trafficking contraband on highways.2 By the 1990s, 
law enforcement personnel were conducting traffic stops and producing tangible results 
through an “all crimes, all threats” approach operating under the guidance of “doing the 
right things.”3 The DEA reported law enforcement made 3,232 seizures on the highways 
in 1994, resulting in “85 tons of marijuana, 23 tons of cocaine, 226 pounds of crack, 26 
pounds of heroin, and $42 million in cash.”4 However, some law enforcement personnel 
have engaged in police misconduct associated with racial profiling and illegal searches, 
and this has negatively affected the lives of citizens.5 In the meantime, law enforcement 
leaders have not developed the policy safeguards necessary to guide the actions of law 
                                                 
1 Drug Enforcement Administration, 2015 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary (Washington, 
DC: Drug Enforcement Administration, 2015), http://www.dea.gov/docs/2015%20NDTA%20Report.pdf, 
v. 
2 Robin S. Engel and Richard Johnson, “Toward a Better Understanding of Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Search and Seizure Rates,” Journal of Criminal Justice 34, no. 6 (2006): 609, 
doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2006.09.014.  
3 White House, “High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program,” accessed August 13, 
2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/high-intensity-drug-trafficking-areas-program.  
4 Michael Janofsky, “In War on Drugs, Police Taking to the Highways,” The New York Times, March 
5, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/05/us/in-war-on-drugs-police-taking-to-the-highways.html, sec. 
U.S.  
5 Michael E. Buerger, “Racial Profiling,” in 21st Century Criminology: A Reference Handbook 21st 
Century Criminology: A Reference Handbook (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2009), 744–
745. 
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enforcement personnel conducting highway interdiction operations and to minimize 
potential problems.  
Although law enforcement personnel throughout the nation may be conducting 
traffic stops in a consistent manner, enforcement operations may not necessarily be 
supervised in a consistent manner. This thesis answers the question of whether policy 
safeguards could help minimize improper practices by personnel conducting highway 
interdiction operations. To answer this question, this project examines the policy 
safeguards use by law enforcement organizations and their potential to provide guidance 
to law enforcement personnel conducting highway interdiction operations. To this end, a 
focus group consisting of 11 state police organizations provided information on policy 
safeguards implemented by their organization and their purpose for guiding the actions of 
law enforcement personnel. The focus group examined seven major categories of policy 
safeguards to determine the level of implementation by each of the state police 
organizations.  
Since the initial deployment of policy safeguards was associated with prosecuting 
criminal offenses, all of the state police organizations participating in the focus group 
reported implementing policy safeguards in this area of need. For example, state police 
organizations implemented measures such as reports and audiovisual recording of traffic 
stops associated with gathering evidence and documenting the actions of personnel. 
Beyond this common point, however, the state police organizations participating in the 
focus group varied with the implementation process.   
Law enforcement organizations had not created policy safeguards for highway 
interdiction from a strategic plan anticipating the deployment of resources to conduct 
operations. In fact, law enforcement organizations have created and implemented many 
of the policy safeguards reactively as a mechanism to mitigate identified problems with 
the strategy of highway interdiction, such as complaints of police misconduct or the 
public’s perception of unfair law enforcement practices.  
The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing highlighted the need for 
transparency as an essential element for law enforcement organizations to establish the 
 xvii 
perception of legitimacy in the community for law enforcement actions.6 Specifically, 
transparency in the decision-making process is important to the public’s perception of 
legitimacy for law enforcement organizations participating in highway interdiction 
operations.7 Some of the state police organizations participating in the focus group 
proactively have implemented policy safeguards to demonstrate more transparency in the 
manner law enforcement personnel conduct highway interdiction operations, specifically 
documenting the decision-making process during encounters with the public.  
Although progress can be demonstrated, there is still more work to be done to 
obtain the transparency described by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing.8 Currently, the majority of state police organizations participating in the focus 
group are collecting statistical data associated with law enforcement personnel 
conducting traffic stops as part of their overall highway interdiction strategy. However, 
three of the 11 participating state police organizations do not collect any statistical 
information that would assist with a broader understanding of the actions of personnel. 
The lack of information weakens the transparency as well as the legitimacy of tactics 
deployed by law enforcement organizations conducting highway interdiction operations.9 
In addition, two of the eight state police organizations that collect statistical information 
do not review the data by supervision. This action weakens the law enforcement 
organization’s ability to understand the entirety of its highway interdiction operations and 
to detect potentially problematic patterns associated with racial profiling.  
The policy safeguards implemented by the focus group organizations 
demonstrated that law enforcement organizations are taking additional steps beyond the 
requirements of the courts to address the use of discretion by law enforcement personnel 
conducting highway interdiction operations. Six out of the 11 state police organizations 
in the focus group have implemented policy safeguards controlling the use of discretion 
                                                 
6 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st 





in the decision-making process. When law enforcement organizations implement policy 
safeguards beyond the minimal legal requirements, they are attentive to the concerns of 
the community about the use of police authority.  
One broad problem area is “hit rates.” Hit rates are calculated by dividing the 
number of law enforcement searches resulting in contraband seized by the total number 
of vehicles searched.10 Limited progress has been achieved, with only two state police 
organization examining hit rates. This function is more closely aligned with the 
supervision of highway interdiction operations versus the preparation of criminal 
investigations for prosecution. Furthermore, it is an area that critics of highway 
interdiction operations have highlighted as empirical proof that law enforcement 
personnel are ineffective at identifying suspicious behavior for criminal activity; critics 
argue higher hit rates would correlate with higher rates of seizure and arrest.11 This topic 
has not been thoroughly explored by leadership of highway interdiction programs to 
establish a better understanding of what defines a successful highway interdiction stop 
versus simply relying on whether or not contraband was seized.  
The lack of consistency in applying policy safeguards, such as hit rate 
calculations, hampers the ability of law enforcement organizations to thoroughly 
comprehend the effectiveness of highway interdiction as a strategy. Instead, law 
enforcement organizations rely on personnel complaints to identify problematic patterns 
associated with the behavior of personnel conducting enforcement operations.12 Can law 
enforcement organizations reduce the number of personnel complaints for personnel 
conducting highway interdiction operations through the implementation of policy 
safeguards?    
This thesis includes a comparative analysis between policy safeguards 
implemented and the number of personnel complaints filed to determine if a correlation 
                                                 
10 Stephen K. Rice and Michael D. White, eds., Race, Ethnicity, and Policing: New and Essential 
Readings (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 193. 
11 Buerger, “Racial Profiling,” 741.  
12 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Building Trust Between the Police and the Citizens 
They Serve (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services), 32. 
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could be identified. Six of the state police organizations participating in the focus group 
discussions provided statistical data associated with personnel complaints for racial 
profiling, illegal searches, and rudeness. Only two of the state police organizations had a 
lower number of complaints per individual assigned to the organization’s highway 
interdiction program as compared to the rest of the organization.  
A stronger argument for the benefits of implementing policy safeguards begins 
with an analysis of the number of times a state police organization exceeded the average 
percentage for implementation. The two state police organizations with lower number of 
personnel complaints filed against per individual assigned to the organization’s highway 
interdiction program were the only organizations to exceed the average implementation at 
least six times. None of the state police organizations with a higher number of personnel 
complaints filed against per individual assigned to their highway interdiction program 
achieved this standard. Although the findings for the implementation of policy safeguards 
are supportive to the effectiveness of highway interdiction by minimizing the number of 
personnel complaints filed against personnel, they were not conclusive.  
Due to the disparity of implementation in policy safeguards for law enforcement 
organizations accompanied with the lack of a standard to evaluate their effectiveness, a 
champion for the strategy of highway interdiction must be identified. The Domestic 
Highway Enforcement (DHE) initiative under the umbrella of the High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Area (HIDTA) is in the best position to advocate for the implementation of 
policy safeguards associated with the national strategy of highway interdiction. The DHE 
initiative, in a collaborative partnership with community leaders and leadership of 
highway interdiction programs, can provide the neutral perspective needed for open and 
honest conversation while still understanding the technical aspects associated with 
specialized units conducting highway interdiction. The standardization of policy 
safeguards for highway interdiction programs throughout the country will help establish 
more transparency and understanding of tactics used by personnel to identify and 
minimize the negative effects of criminal activity. 
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Law enforcement agencies throughout the nation conduct highway interdiction 
operations designed to identify individuals with nefarious intentions. This practice 
emerged in the 1980s as a result of the nation’s “War on Drugs,” when law enforcement 
agencies began deploying specialized personnel to look beyond the initial traffic violation 
for indicators of criminal activity.13  
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) developed a program, known as 
Operation Pipeline, which provided specialized training for law enforcement personnel 
focusing on identifying individuals trafficking contraband on highways.14 Operation 
Pipeline and similar programs initiated by other agencies resulted in the arrest of 
individuals engaged in a variety of criminal activities, such as distribution of narcotics, 
human trafficking, and terrorism. By the 1990s, highway interdiction in the form of 
traffic stops was producing tangible criminal arrests that enhanced the nation’s security 
and addressed public safety concerns against drug trafficking organizations.15 The DEA 
reported that 3,232 seizures were conducted on the highways in 1994 resulting in “85 
tons of marijuana, 23 tons of cocaine, 226 pounds of crack, 26 pounds of heroin, and $42 
million in cash.”16   
Highway interdiction has proven to be a successful law enforcement strategy for 
identifying criminal activity and contributing to the overall security of our nation. For 
example, in 1995, an Oklahoma Highway Patrolman stopped a Mercury Marquis on 
                                                 
13 Robin S. Engel and Richard Johnson, “Toward a Better Understanding of Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Search and Seizure Rates,” Journal of Criminal Justice 34, no. 6 (2006), 609, 
doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2006.09.014.   
14 Ibid. 
15 Kami Chavis Simmons, “Beginning to End Racial Profiling: Definitive Solutions to an Elusive 
Problem,” Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice 18, no. 1 (2011): 26.  25–54.  
16 Michael Janofsky, “In War on Drugs, Police Taking to the Highways,” The New York Times, March 
5, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/05/us/in-war-on-drugs-police-taking-to-the-highways.html, sec. 
U.S.  
2 
Interstate 35 for failing to display a license plate. 17 During the encounter, Trooper 
Charlie Hanger became suspicious of the driver’s actions and began to investigate. 18 The 
driver turned out to be Timothy McVeigh, a terrorist who had recently bombed the Alfred 
P. Murrah Federal Building, killing 168 people. 19 Hanger spotted an illegal concealed 
weapon on McVeigh’s person—the .45 caliber Glock was later found to be loaded with 
particularly lethal Black Talon rounds—and arrested the bomber.20 When federal 
investigators turned their focus to McVeigh, they found him in the Noble County Jail, 
thanks to the highway interdiction stop.21 
Other contributions to the nation’s security includes numerous contraband 
seizures conducted each year by law enforcement—for example, five kilograms of 
cocaine was seized on Interstate 85 in 2001 when the driver was stopped for speeding by 
the South Carolina Highway Patrol Advanced Criminal Enforcement (ACE) Team.22 The 
investigation was pursued by the DEA, and with additional investigative efforts, the 
result was 38 additional kilogram of cocaine, 20 pounds of marijuana, and $10,000 in 
currency; the total was more than $3.8 million in contraband and assets seized.23  
By 2006, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) had established 
the Domestic Highway Enforcement (DHE) initiative to implement a national strategy for 
                                                 
17 Stephen Braun, “Trooper’s Vigilance Led to Arrest of Blast Suspect: Bombing: Charlie Hanger’s 
Suspicions about the Man He Nabbed during a Traffic Stop Turned out to Be Justified,” Los Angeles Times, 
April 22, 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-04-22/news/mn-57433_1_charlie-hanger.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Joe Davidson, “Oklahoma City Bombing Still Sears Federal Workers,” The Washington Post, April 
20, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2015/04/20/oklahoma-city-bombing-still-
sears-federal-workers/.  
20 Dan Marcou, “Police History: How Trooper Charlie Hanger Caught the Oklahoma City Bomber,” 
PoliceOne, April 17, 2015, https://www.policeone.com/police-history/articles/8527487-Police-History-
How-Trooper-Charlie-Hanger-caught-the-Oklahoma-City-bomber/.  
21 Ibid. 
22 South Carolina Department of Public Safety, “Two Separate Highway Patrol Traffic Stops Result in 
Seizure of Drugs and Money Worth More Than $4.4 Million,” press release, April 26, 2001, 
http://www.scdps.gov/oea/nr2001/042601b.html.  
23 Ibid.  
3 
law enforcement organizations participating in highway interdiction.24 The goal was to 
establish a partnership for “collaborative, intelligence-led policing to enhance 
coordinated, multi-jurisdictional operational law enforcement efforts on interstate 
highways specifically identified as drug trafficking corridors.”25 Participating 
organizations, such as the Texas Department of Public Safety, reported that drug 
trafficking organizations actively use our nation’s highways to transport all sorts of 
contraband—drugs, weapons, illegal profits, and so on.26 In 2011, the DHE initiative 
reported statistical information to Congress asserting that $377 million worth of 
contraband and other valued assets had been seized from the highways of the United 
States associated with the initiative.27   
In 2011, approximately 21.2 million people were stopped by law enforcement for 
a major or minor violations “while operating a motor vehicle,” resulting in a substantial 
number of contacts, beyond the original violation, between law enforcement and 
individuals potentially involved in criminal activity.28 At times, law enforcement 
personnel were proactively engaging these drivers and attempting to identify indicators of 
criminal activity. Requests for consent to search vehicles emerged as a primary tactic 
deployed by law enforcement during highway stops to discover contraband and other 
evidence of criminal activity.29  
This tactic was supported in opinions connected with rulings of cases heard in the 
courts. In 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed aspects of consensual searches, and 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote in the opinion for Florida v. Jimeno, “We have 
                                                 
24 Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Areas Program Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, 2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/hidta_2011.pdf, 6.    
25 Ibid. 
26 Texas Department of Public Safety, Agency Strategic Plan, 2009–2013 (Austin, TX: Texas 
Department of Public Safety, 2009), http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/dpsStrategicPlan/2009-
2013/11astrategicoutlookall.pdf, 72. 
27 Executive Office of the President, High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, 6.  
28 Lynn Langton and Matthew Durose, Police Behavior during Traffic and Street Stops, 2011 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013), 3.  
29 Jacinta M. Gau, “Consent Searches as a Threat to Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy: An 
Analysis of Consent Requests During Traffic Stops,” Criminal Justice Policy Review 24, no. 6 (2012): 6, 
doi: 10.1177/0887403412464547.  
4 
long approved consensual searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to 
conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.”30 While studying racial 
profiling and vehicle searches, researchers Patricia Warren and Donald Tomaskovic 
wrote, “The Supreme Court has ruled that consent searches are an important part of 
police investigatory work, reasoning that officers must have some discretionary power to 
control crime effectively.”31 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How effective are law enforcement policy safeguards in minimizing improper 
practices by highway interdiction operations personnel? Do these safeguards contribute to 
the effectiveness of highway interdiction? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Allegations began to surface concerning the tactics employed by law enforcement 
performing highway interdiction operations. In 1992, Robert Wilkins was stopped by the 
Maryland State Police resulting in a vehicle search for 30 minutes that did not produce 
any evidence of criminal activity.32 A lawsuit, filed by Robert Wilkins, alleged he 
experienced civil rights violations during the traffic stop.33 As a result, the Maryland 
State Police settled the lawsuit for “just under one hundred thousand dollars and an 
agreement that the agency would maintain computer records regarding all motorists 
stopped.”34 The effectiveness of highway interdiction as a legitimate law enforcement 
tactic has come under sustained question for various reasons. Minority communities and 
civil rights organizations have raised concerns that law enforcement personnel bring a 
                                                 
30 500 U.S. 248 at 250-251.  
31 Patricia Y. Warren and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, “Racial Profiling and Searches: Did the Politics 
of Racial Profiling Change Police Behavior?,” Criminology & Public Policy 8, no. 2 (2009): 357, 
doi:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2009.00556.x.  
32 Kenneth Meeks, Driving while Black: Highways, Shopping Malls, Taxi Cabs, Sidewalks: How to 
Fight Back If You Are a Victim of Racial Profiling, 1st ed. (New York: Broadway Books, 2000), 21–24.  
33 Stephen K. Rice and Michael D. White, eds. Race, Ethnicity, and Policing: New and Essential 
Readings (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 162.  
34 Ibid.  
5 
culture of bias when interacting with minorities.35 This concern includes law 
enforcement personnel conducting enforcement operations by stopping minority drivers 
and disproportionately subjecting them to vehicle searches.36 Organizations, such as the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), support accusations of racial profiling by 
initiating lawsuits against law enforcement organizations suspected of participating in the 
practice.37 Racial profiling, “the stopping or searching vehicles and drivers based 
primarily on race, rather than any suspicion or observed violation of the law,”38 prompted 
Department of Justice (DOJ) to determine the validity of accusations for racial 
profiling.39   
In 1998, two New Jersey state troopers were involved in a use-of-force incident 
with four minority young men that resulted in three of them being shot.40 In 2003, a civil 
suit was filed against the Maryland State Police alleging that minority drivers were 
singled out for vehicle searches at a greater rate than white drivers.41 In addition, the DOJ 
analyzed data associated with the New Jersey and Maryland State Police organizations, 
and its findings supported accusations of racial profiling.42 Members of the minority 
community have expressed concerns that law enforcement personnel were targeting them 
for “Driving While Black—stopping, questioning, and even searching black drivers who 
have committed no crime, based on the excuse of a traffic offense.”43 
                                                 
35 Sherrilyn Ifill, Statement by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. before the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (New York: NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund, 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/files/case_issue/Sherrilyn%20Ifill%20Testimony-
Task%20Force%20on%2021st%20Century%20Policing.pdf, 5.  
36 Rice and White, Race, Ethnicity, and Policing, 264.  
37 Meeks, Driving while Black, 33. 
38 Donald Tomaskovic-Devey and Patricia Warren, “Explaining and Eliminating Racial Profiling,” 
Contexts 8, no. 2 (2009): 35, doi:10.1525/ctx.2009.8.2.34.  
39 Michael E. Buerger, “Racial Profiling,” in 21st Century Criminology: A Reference Handbook 21st 
Century Criminology: A Reference Handbook, ed. J. Mitchell Miller (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, Inc., 2009), 744–745.   
40 Ibid., 744.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid., 744–745.  
43 Rice and White, Race, Ethnicity, and Policing, 5.  
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Researchers focused on consensual searches of vehicles in which law enforcement 
personnel exercise a considerable amount of discretion when deciding which vehicles to 
search.44 The driver’s consent obviates the legal requirement for law enforcement 
personnel to justify the request.45 Proponents of highway interdiction advocate that 
arrests from consensual searches are a combination of experience and observations by 
law enforcement personnel supported by court convictions.46 Individuals opposed to 
consent searches identify the low hit rates as empirically proof that highway interdiction 
is not an effective strategy and “little more than a blind squirrel stumbling across as acorn 
by chance.”47 The results spell trouble beyond an inconvenienced driver. Jacinta M. Gau 
concluded that individuals subjected to consent searches without the discovery of 
evidence of criminality are more likely to view the actions of law enforcement during the 
encounter as improper.48  
Moreover, Dr. Katherine Y. Barnes has noted the low percentage of vehicle stops 
that actually result in contraband seizures, which suggests that the indicators on which 
law enforcement personnel rely to identify individuals with contraband are not accurate 
or especially helpful.49 To be sure, other theorists advocate for these criminal indicators 
as a legitimate tool for law enforcement personnel who have developed them from 
patterns identified in criminal investigations and observations.50 Researchers, such as 
Michael E. Buerger, argue that hit rates based exclusively on drug violations do not 
accurately reflect the success of highway interdiction practices.51 After all, any number 
of serious but non-drug related criminal violations can be identified in a traffic stop, for 
example: murder, human trafficking, or terrorism. Although this thesis does not explore 
                                                 
44 Scott Henson, Flawed Enforcement (Austin, TX: American Civil Liberties Union of Texas, 2004), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/FilesPDFs/flawed%20enforcement.pdf, 8.  
45 Ibid., 3. 
46 Buerger, “Racial Profiling,” 741.  
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48 Gau, “Consent Searches as a Threat,” 6.  
49 Katherine Y. Barnes, “Assessing the Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction Absent 
Racial Profiling,” Duke Law Journal 54, no. 5 (2005): 1134.  
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the validity of criminal indicators used by law enforcement personnel for highway 
interdiction, it is important to note that extensive research has been conducted on the 
subject identifying “racial differences in suspect demeanor can affect outcomes in police-
citizen interactions.”52 Law enforcement personnel conducting highway interdiction 
operations should be aware of this potential influence when determining appropriate 
actions during a traffic stop. 
The credibility of law enforcement organizations is under siege as communities 
continue to express concerns associated with unfair treatment and exposure to police 
misconduct. The frustration of the minority community about its relationship with the law 
enforcement profession can be illustrated by the testimony provided by the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to the President’s Task 
Force on 21st–Century Policing.53 Sherrilyn Ifill, President and Director Counsel for the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, characterizes the relationship between law 
enforcement personnel and black communities as a “longstanding problem of police 
abuse and excessive force.”54 Psychologists researching reactions to racial profiling from 
minority individuals in Washington, DC neighborhoods discovered that minorities had 
feelings of “anger, powerlessness, and stigmatization” when subjected to suspicion of 
criminal activity by law enforcement personnel using race as an indicator.55  
Polls conducted by Gallup, Inc. over the years have monitored how individuals 
felt concerning the treatment of black members from the minority community at the 
hands of law enforcement during stops for traffic violations.56 As shown in Table 1, the 
results indicate that a significant portion of the population, regardless of race, felt that 
black members of their community were being “treated less unfairly than whites.”57 In 
                                                 
52 Rice and White, Race, Ethnicity, and Policing, 197–198.   
53 Ifill, Statement by the NAACP, 2.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Patrick Ibe, Charles Ochie, and Evaristus Obiyan, “Racial Misuse of ‘Criminal Profiling’ by Law 
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addition, the vast majority of black adults expressed opinions that the black community 
was being treated unfairly.58 








 % % % 
National adults    
2015 Jun 15–Jul 10 43 54 3 
2007 Jun 4–24 37 55 8 
2004 Jun 9–30 38 53 9 
2002 Dec 9–2003 Feb 11 39 50 11 
2001 Mar 23–May 16 39 51 10 
1999 Sep 24–Nov 16 35 54 11 
1998 Aug 13–Oct 26  33 57 10 
1997 Jan4–Feb 28 34 51 15 
    
Whites    
2015 Jun 15—Jul 10 34 63 3 
2007 Jun 4–24 31 60 9 
2004 Jun 9–30 32 59 9 
2002 Dec 9–2003 Feb 11 35 54 11 
2001 Mar 23–May 16 35 54 11 
1999 Sep 24–Nov 16 30 59 11 
1998 Aug 13–Oct 26  29 61 10 
1997 Jan 4–Feb 28 30 54 16 
    
                                                 
58 Ibid.  









Blacks    
2015 Jun 15–Jul 10 73 26 2 
2007 Jun 4–24 73 24 4 
2004 Jun 9–30 66 28 6 
2002 Dec 9–2003 Feb 11 69 27 4 
2001 Mar 23–May 16 66 30 4 
1999 Sep 24–Nov 16 64 31 5 
1998 Aug 13–Oct 26  55 38 7 
1997 Jan 4–Feb 28 60 33 7 
    
Hispanics    
2015 Jun 15–Jul 10 54 42 4 
2007 Jun 4–24 51 42 6 
2004 Jun 9–30 47 45 8 
 
The deterioration of the relationship between the law enforcement profession and 
the minority community has persisted for so long that minority parents feel the need to 
protect their children by having a conversation commonly referred to as “the talk.”60 
When minority children reach the age to obtain a driver’s license, parents openly discuss 
concerns about law enforcement racially profiling minority drivers and the potential for 
the contact to escalate into a life-threatening situation.61  
In a dissenting opinion for Utah v. Strieff, U. S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor acknowledged “the talk,” proclaiming minority parents of “black and brown” 
skin have undertaken conversations with children for generations associated with fears of 
how law enforcement with guns will interact with their children, “instructing them never 
                                                 
60 Center for Government and Public Affairs, Auburn University Montgomery, Bias-based Policing: A 
Study for the Commonwealth of Virginia (Montgomery, AL: Center for Government and Public Affairs, 
Auburn University Montgomery, 2004), 83.  
61 Ibid.  
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to run down the street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not even think 
of talking back to a stranger.”62 She gave voice to a feeling of being “degraded” when 
law enforcement personnel extend their interaction with individuals while looking for 
criminal activity beyond the initial justification for the contact.63 The current state of the 
relationship between law enforcement and the minority community is problematic. In 
order for law enforcement officers to be viewed as a legitimate force to maintain order 
and administer justice, their actions must be interpreted as fair in the eyes of the 
community.64   
Critics of highway interdiction also have challenged the true motivation of law 
enforcement organizations that conduct such operations. Specifically, detractors claim 
that highway interdiction is more about making money than making the highway safe.65 
Indeed in 2004, the ACLU identified task forces in Texas that were seizing assets of such 
value that the confiscated property could sustain the task force’s operational budget for 
the year—even though the task forces demonstrated a relatively low “hit rate” of 
converting traffic stops into asset forfeiture seizures.66 Some representatives of 
government authority have publicly expressed desires to compensate for budgetary 
shortages by implementing an interdiction program, further complicating the public view 
of highway interdiction.67    
Personnel conducting highway interdiction may work without a dedicated 
supervisor monitoring their actions. The lack of supervision is particularly problematic 
when law enforcement organizations participate in task forces conducting highway 
interdiction.68 Organizations contribute personnel to the task force but do not retain direct 
                                                 
62 Supreme Court of the United States, Utah v. Strieff 579 U.S. (2016), 12.  
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64 Gau, “Consent Searches as a Threat,” 2.  
65 Henson, Flawed Enforcement, 6.  
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control over the actions of their participating member(s) from other departments.69 
Problems can emerge if a supervisor does not adequately monitor the actions of personnel 
to recognize patterns associated with racial profiling or other improper behavior by 
subordinates.70  
Still, amid the controversies about highway interdiction, the need for such a 
strategy remains as great as it was when Trooper Hanger pulled over Timothy McVeigh. 
The 2015 National Drug Threat Assessment reported that 120 people died in the United 
States each day in 2014 from a drug overdoses.71 Law enforcement organizations need 
strategies such as highway interdiction to help combat drug trafficking organizations 
smuggling dangerous drugs into communities. Foreign and domestic terrorists are using 
the nation’s highway systems to further their plots and commit nefarious acts to harm 
individuals, as do human traffickers, bank robbers, kidnappers, murderers, and serial 
killers. When law enforcement stops these individuals traveling on the highway, each 
contact is opportunity for law enforcement to produce information or evidence associated 
with criminal activity. Our democracy was built on a foundation of trust between citizens 
and government authorities who are responsible for protecting them and serving the 
needs of the community.72 As such, a reassessment of highway interdiction is in order. 
The leadership of law enforcement organizations must seek opportunities designed to 
ensure the community views their actions as fair.  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In the case of gathering statistical information associated with traffic stops, all law 
enforcement organizations do not gather the same information in compliance with a 
policy safeguard or simply do not gather any information. When discussing statistical 
                                                 
69 Ibid.  
70 Kirk Miller, “The Institutionalization of Racial Profiling Policy: An Examination of Antiprofiling 
Policy Adoption among Large Law Enforcement Agencies,” Crime & Delinquency 59, no. 1 (2013): 33, 
doi:10.1177/0011128708328863.  
71 Drug Enforcement Administration, 2015 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary (Washington, 
DC: Drug Enforcement Administration, 2015), http://www.dea.gov/docs/2015%20NDTA%20Report.pdf, 
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72 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 
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data associated with police shootings, Chief Charles H. Ramsey of the Philadelphia 
Police Department stated, “If you don’t have the data, people think you are hiding 
something. This position is something that comes under the header of establishing 
trust.”73 The variance in policy safeguards can affect how members of communities view 
the legitimacy of the actions of law enforcement personnel.  
This thesis examines the idea that policy safeguards can guide the actions of 
highway interdiction personnel. To this end, it uses a policy analysis method. 
Additionally, the researcher convened a focus group of 11 individuals supervising state 
police highway interdiction operations for an open discussion of policy safeguards 
implemented by their organization to identify operational practices.   
D. SELECTION 
The selection of law enforcement organizations to participate was restricted to 
organizations with specialized teams designed to conduct highway interdiction operations 
and that have created policies specific to those operations. The participation was also 
restricted to state police organizations participating in the DHE initiative. These 
organizations were selected because the DHE initiative encourages information sharing 
as part of a national collaborative effort, and they have demonstrated their willingness to 
share information in the past. The participation in the comparative analysis associated 
with policy safeguards was further restricted to state police organizations since these 
organizations typically have the same primary responsibility of highway patrol.   
As illustrated in Figure 1, the continental United States was divided into four 
regions to identify participation without narrowing the attention to a specific state police 
organization, allowing the focus to remain on the strategy of highway interdiction 
operations. Each state police organization was randomly assigned a number for 
identification purposes that correlates with the policy responses. Figure 1 shows the 
number of participants by region. 
                                                 
73 Kevin Johnson, “Panel to Consider Tracking of Civilians Killed by Police,” USA Today, December 
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Figure 1.  Focus Group Participation74 
Northeast Region Participants:  1 South Region Participants: 6 
Midwest Region Participants: 3 West Region Participants: 1 
1. Identification of Safeguards
The researcher examined organizational policies that guide the actions of highway 
interdiction personnel to identify safeguards that have been established specifically for 
highway interdiction operations. The researcher also identified additional safeguards in 
the literature review and analyzed them to develop a more comprehensive catalog.  
2. Strengths and Weaknesses Discussion
This researcher conducted a comparative analysis for each state police 
organization participating in the focus group discussion to determine the level of 
implementation of each identified policy safeguards. After the focus group discussion, 
74 Adapted from: U.S. Census, “Census Regions and Division of the United States,” accessed 
November 26, 2016, http://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf.  
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the researcher evaluated each policy safeguard to document any unintended consequences 
conveyed during the discussion. In addition the researcher evaluated the strength and 
weaknesses of each policy safeguard, including variables such as the ability of the policy 
safeguard to control the actions of personnel, practicality of acceptance by personnel, 
widespread implementation by organizations, and potential for positive perception by the 
public. Finally, this researcher integrated literature with the strengths and weaknesses 
discussion to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the policy safeguards 
identified.   
The creation of policy safeguards requires a substantial amount of dedication 
from the leadership of law enforcement organization and a commitment to implement 
guidance for personnel.75 This action must be supported by training for a comprehensive 
understanding by personnel along with efforts to monitor their actions for compliance.76 
Once organizations establish policy safeguards, they may be periodically required to 
make modifications as circumstances affecting the effectiveness of policy safeguards 
change.77 Examples would include feedback from personnel conducting highway 
interdiction operations and complaints associated with potential misconduct identified by 
members of the community.78 
E. QUANTITATIVE DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS 
The next phase of the research included gathering statistical information from 
state police organizations to determine if a correlation can be identified between the 
implementation of policy safeguards and accusations of improper practices. The data the 
researcher requested includes number of complaints filed against personnel in the 
categories of racial profiling, illegal searches, and rudeness.  
Then, this researcher analyzed the data to determine if the number of personnel 
complaints per individual governed by highway interdiction policy safeguards differs 
                                                 
75 Johnson, “Panel to Consider Tracking of Civilians Killed,” 191.  
76 Ibid., 190.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid.  
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when compared to the number of complaints per individual in the organization. 
Additionally, the researcher evaluated the statistical information to determine if any 
correlation or validity could be established between the number of complaints and the 
impact of highway interdiction safeguards implemented by the organization. A challenge 
for this researcher was the manner in which state police organizations categorize 
complaints by definition and their willingness to share the statistical information. 
F. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In Chapter II of this thesis, the literature review explores operations on highway 
interdiction to identify the various approaches for interpreting the challenges associated 
with the enforcement strategy. Chapter III examines the various policy safeguards for 
highway interdiction implemented by the state police organizations participating in the 
focus group. Each state police organization is scored to determine the level of 
implementation for identified policy safeguards. Chapter IV gathers complaints filed 
against personnel of the state police organizations participating in the focus group and 
analyzes them to determine if there are any correlations in the statistical information. 
Specifically, this research compared data associated with complaints filed against 
personnel for racial profiling, illegal searches, and general rudeness in general 
enforcement operations to the number of complaints filed per individual conducting 
highway interdiction. Chapter V analyzes various options available to effectively guide 
the actions of personnel conducting highway interdiction operations from a national 
platform. The final chapter discusses the results and findings from this thesis exploring 
the need for additional research governing the actions of personnel conducting highway 
interdiction operations through the establishment of policy safeguards as law enforcement 
enters the twenty-first century for policing.     
16 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
17 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of the literature demonstrates the challenges that law enforcement 
organizations have encountered while conducting highway interdiction operations. The 
tactics law enforcement organizations use to identify and apprehend individuals involved 
in criminal activity are criticized for racial profiling, biased policing, ineffective 
consensual searches, and policing for profit. In an attempt to control the actions of 
personnel and reiterate the legitimacy of highway interdiction, some law enforcement 
organizations have developed ad hoc policy safeguards. Many of these policy safeguards 
were created in response to incidents alleging improper actions by law enforcement 
personnel. Examples would include the 1998 New Jersey Turnpike shooting and 
accusations of racial profiling in Maryland during 2003.79 Law enforcement 
organizations have struggled to establish a consistent policy standard to minimize 
accusations against personnel. Hence, the challenges have continued to surface and 
evolve as the strategy of highway interdiction enters the realm of policing in the twenty-
first century. 
A. IDENTIFYING CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
Robin Engel and Richard Johnson conducted a literature review of studies of 13 
state police organizations conducting highway interdiction to determine the probability of 
successfully identifying individuals transporting contraband.80 The review examined 
statistical data associated with the racial composition of drivers for vehicles searched and 
whether or not the search resulted in the seizure of evidence.81 The findings determined 
that law enforcement personnel conducting highway interdiction were relatively 
unsuccessful at identifying vehicles containing contraband when consent searches were 
conducted as compared to searches justified by probable cause, plain view, or canine 
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81 Ibid., 614–615.  
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alerts.82 Due to the low rate that evidence of a crime being identified during the search, 
these findings directly discredit the indicators for identifying criminal activity in vehicles 
currently taught to law enforcement personnel as the authors have found them to be 
inaccurate..83 In addition, the research concluded that law enforcement organizations 
should restrict the use of consent searches for personnel conducting traffic stops.84 This 
restriction would increase the public’s confidence in the law enforcement organization to 
act fairly, allowing individuals to view law enforcement as legitimate.85   
In a study titled Consent Searches as a Threat to Procedural Justice and Police 
Legitimacy, Jacintoa Gau addressed the additional negative consequences that emerge 
when individuals are subjected to consensual requests.86 Because consent searches are 
less likely to turn up contraband, a significant number of drivers are subjected to consent 
searches that result in no contraband being located, which often comes across to the 
public as an arbitrary, heavy-handed law enforcement tactic.87 Tensions run even higher 
among drivers and observers who are already suspicious of the actions of law 
enforcement and question the legitimacy of the original traffic stop.88 Gau agreed with 
Engel and Johnson that the use of consent searches should be restricted by the leadership 
of law enforcement organizations.89 Gau stated, “Police executives, therefore, must make 
a choice, as there is a trade-off between the convenience and possible short-term benefits 
of consent searches and the longer-term and more enduring effects of a populace that 
trusts and cooperates with its police.”90 
Gau’s study entitled Consent Searches as a Threat to Procedural Justice and 
Police Legitimacy recommended that law enforcement organization should evaluate the 
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benefits from consensual searches versus the negative associations when individuals not 
engaged in criminal activity are subjected to searches.91 The strategy of using consent 
searches to discover contraband could further weaken relationships with minority 
communities and broaden the perception of illegitimate behavior by law enforcement 
personnel.92  
B. BIAS WITHIN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Negative associations of stereotyping groups of individuals by law enforcement 
personnel can be found when examining experiences through exposure to potential 
hazardous situations and criminal activity.93 Rob Tillyer and Robin Engel used the social 
conditioning model to examine how past experiences by law enforcement personnel 
affects their behavior.94 The model demonstrates how law enforcement personnel 
develop subconscious biases through experiences with criminal activity.95 These biases 
can affect the decision-making processes of personnel entrusted to conduct law 
enforcement responsibilities.96   
The findings of Engel and Johnson recommend that law enforcement 
organizations consider training for personnel on subconscious biases when organizations 
implement training programs.97 Law enforcement organizations must train personnel to 
be aware of their potential subconscious biases and ensure individuals they encounter are 
treated in a fair and impartial manner.98 
Traffic stops are a common interaction between law enforcement and members of 
the community and, at times, have generated concerns that there is a disparity in the 
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manner minority members of the community are treated by law enforcement.99 Racial 
profiling has increasingly emerged as a nationwide community concern. In response, the 
ACLU has developed two strategies to address the problem.100 First, the organization is 
supporting litigation against law enforcement agencies that they determine have exhibited 
patterns of racial profiling by law enforcement personnel interacting with the minority 
community.101 Second, the ACLU lobbies legislative authorities throughout the nation to 
gain support for enacting laws requiring law enforcement organizations to gather 
statistical information associated with identifying the racial composition of drivers being 
stopped.102 These laws are designed to record the disparity of minorities being stopped 
and confirm the existence of racial profiling.103 By 1999, several states, such as 
Connecticut, North Carolina, Washington, and Missouri, had enacted laws mandating law 
enforcement organizations to collect statistical data identifying the race of the driver 
associated with traffic stops.104 The trend continued as other states began to collect 
statistical data either by legislative action or voluntarily compliance.105  
Once statistical data began to be collected, it became necessary to have a 
benchmark to compare the data for systematically identifying and eliminating racial 
profiling within law enforcement actions.106 External benchmarks, such as the racial 
demographics associated with the community population, initially emerged as the logical 
mechanisms to rationally compare the statistical data gathered from traffic stops.107 
However, the comparisons became difficult as variables emerged that might have an 
impact on statistical data.108 What was the racial composition of individuals exposed to 
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the police?109 Or, what was the racial composition of individuals committing violations 
of law, which could subject them to a possible traffic stop?110 The statistical data for the 
racial composition of individuals encountering the police in the two questions could be 
different from the racial demographics associated with the community’s population.   
The technique of “observation benchmarks” emerged as a methodology pioneered 
by John Lamberth during his research of traffic stops on the New Jersey Turnpike.111 
Researchers monitored traffic on the New Jersey Turnpike to identify the racial 
composition of drivers who were speeding on the interstate to identify a “subpopulation 
at risk” of those encountering law enforcement action.112 The racial composition of the 
subpopulation could be used to establish a benchmark for comparison with the racial 
statistical data collected by law enforcement personnel conducting traffic stops.113 
Although this methodology provided the ability to identify a subpopulation, questions by 
researchers remained about the composition of the subpopulation.114 The methodology 
was not as effective in urban areas where observation benchmarking was more 
difficult.115 On the New Jersey Turnpike, speeding was used to identify the 
subpopulation because state police personnel emphasize traffic enforcement.116 Drivers 
stopped for other violations were not incorporated into the subpopulation, thus weakening 
the comparison when used as a benchmark for the totality of vehicles stopped by law 
enforcement personnel.117  
The evolution of benchmarking progressed to compare racial statistical data for 
law enforcement personnel who work the same shifts and locations as peers.118 This 
                                                 
109 Ibid., 181.  
110 Ibid.  
111 Ibid., 184.  
112 Ibid., 183.  
113 Ibid., 184.  
114 Ibid.  
115 Ibid.  
116 Ibid.  
117 Ibid., 184–185.  
118 Ibid., 189.  
22 
technique has become known as internal benchmarking.119 This methodology is 
especially adaptable to highway interdiction personnel who work as teams operating 
under the same policies and monitoring essentially the same traffic.120 Under these 
conditions, the racial statistical data of the peer group members can be compared to 
identify disparities in the racial compositions of drivers stopped for traffic violations.121  
The collection of statistical data by law enforcement organization is only the 
starting point for addressing racial disparities in drivers stopped for traffic violations.122 
As researcher Lorie Fridell noted in By the Numbers: A Guide for Analyzing Race Data 
from Vehicle Stops, disparity in racial statistical data can be measured, but it is difficult to 
identify the cause of the disparity.123 Just because a disparity is identified, it does not 
necessarily mean that racial profiling by law enforcement personnel is the cause.124 
Equally true is the lack of disparity in racial statistical data does not necessarily eliminate 
the possibility of racial profiling by law enforcement personnel.125   
Patricia Warren and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey conducted a study to analyze the 
potential effects of gathering statistical data as a corrective measure for racial 
profiling.126 As empirical proof of potential biases by law enforcement personnel, 
Tomaskovic-Devey and Warren examines statistical information associated with the 
North Carolina State Highway Patrol concerning the enforcement actions of personnel.127 
They examined the discovery of contraband during vehicle searches before racial 
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profiling allegations surfaced as compared to the year after the allegations.128 The 
statistical information measuring “hit rates” for minority drivers aligned closely with hit 
rates among white drivers after the allegation surfaced.129 Before the allegations, 
however, the hit rates for minority drivers were substantially lower than hit rates for 
white drivers.130  
Prior to racial profiling accusations entering the national stage, black drivers 
stopped were four times as likely to be searched as compared to white drivers stopped.131 
The search rate for black drivers was considerably higher, although the searches of 
vehicles operated by black drivers were 33 percent less likely to produce evidence of a 
crime.132 After racial profiling accusations, the search rate for black drivers was cut 50 
percent and the disparity in the percentage for recovering evidence between black and 
white drivers was eliminated.133 The clear difference that the added scrutiny made 
suggested that law enforcement was exercising a bias against minority drivers.134     
Warren and Tomaskovic credited media attention and legislative action as 
successful mechanisms to correct undesirable law enforcement behavior by implementing 
statistical gathering processes.135 This accountability helped eliminate inherent biases 
that were contained in law enforcement personnel’s subconscious.136 Supervision plays a 
critical role to ensure compliance with established policies and procedures associated 
with protective measures.137 The researchers “encouraged police organizations to collect 
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data regularly and encourage supervisors to become familiar with the data to monitor 
properly the enforcement practices of their officers.”138 
C. STATISTICAL DATA GATHERING 
Law enforcement organizations must collect statistical data associated with the 
racial composition of drivers stopped by law enforcement personnel as recommended by 
Warren and Tomaskovic.139 They explain,  
By 2007, a total of 25 states had enacted legislation requiring police 
agencies to collect data on the race of motorists involved in traffic stops, 
with selected police departments in 22 other states voluntarily agreeing to 
collect such data.140  
Law enforcement organizations are also investing into technology to supplement the 
statistical monitoring of personnel, such as video recording traffic stops.141 A study 
conducted by Paul Heaton reviewed results of public awareness of critical issues and 
concluded that policy makers have implemented changes to organizational policies 
causing law enforcement personnel to modify actions.142 
A study conducted by Kirk Miller expanded on the ramifications associated with 
policy adaptation by law enforcement organizations.143 The study determined that law 
enforcement organizations are more likely to be responsive to community concerns if the 
minority leaders draw attention to a particular issue requiring change.144 Law 
enforcement organizations have a vested interest to implement policies that are view 
beneficial by the community, which in turn results in an enhanced relationship and 
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perception of legitimacy.145 This requires law enforcement organizations to adapt polices 
supportive of eliminating the perception of racial profiling, such as statistical data 
collection.146 The organizational leadership should be cognizant of minority community 
concerns and be proactive to sensitive issue that could affect the reputation of the 
organization.147 These efforts must be transparent for law enforcement organizations to 
operate with the support of the public and be viewed as legitimate.148  
D. SEEKING AN ANSWER TO POLICE MISCONDUCT 
Historically, the DOJ has investigated allegations of police misconduct that have 
emerged from undesirable behavior by law enforcement personnel or organizations.149 
This authority was legislated to the U.S. attorney general from Congress under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14141.150 The primary objective of this legislation is to ensure law enforcement 
behaviors are in compliance with the rights afforded to citizens by way of the U.S. 
Constitution.151 The DOJ can influence a national standard for law enforcement actions 
by identifying undesirable behaviors and implementing corrective measures.152 Although 
the investigations can influence national standards, the DOJ has averaged three 
investigations each year—less than one full-scale investigation annually.153 The limited 
number of investigations conducted annually is problematic when considering the United 
States possesses over 18,000 police departments.154  
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As an alternative to the authority granted to the U.S. attorney general under 42 
U.S.C. § 14141, Congressman John Conyers, Jr. has proposed legislation since 1997 
commonly referred to the “End Racial Profiling Act.”155 The act would mandate the 
implementation of control measures for racial profiling under the U.S. attorney 
general.156 Measures include prohibiting racial profiling, gathering statistical data, 
training, grant funds for implementation, and authorizing investigations for allegations of 
racial profiling.157 Interestingly, the legislation authorizes the U.S. attorney general to 
deny law enforcement organizations grant funding if the U.S. attorney general determines 
it appropriate.158 The measure would allow the U.S. attorney general to influence state or 
local law enforcement organizations dependent on federal grant funding to operate.159    
Organizational accreditation is another possibility to establish a national standard 
for law enforcement organization conducting highway interdiction operations.160 Policies 
and procedures would be established and law enforcement organizations would agree to 
external reviews for evaluating their performance.161 The Commission of Accreditation 
for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) operates under a list of 463 standards for 
accreditation, and law enforcement already must comply with all the mandatory 
standards, including 80 percent of “other-than-mandatory” standards to receive the 
designation.162 The oversight protective measures could be incorporated in the CALEA 
standards and organizations seeking to perform highway interdiction could subject their 
organization to the external review.  
                                                 
155 Rice and White, Race, Ethnicity, and Policing, 61. 
156 Ibid., 157–158.  
157 End Racial Profiling Act 2015 (2015), 9–14.   
158 Ibid., 7–12. 
159 Ibid., 9–14. 
160 Manuel P. Teodoro and Adam G. Hughes, “Socializer or Signal? How Agency Accreditation 
Affects Organizational Culture,” Public Administration Review 72, no. 4 (2012): 583.   
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid., 584. 
27 
A study conducted by Manuel Teodoro and Adam Hughes examined if 
accreditation improves the performance of personnel.163 Specifically, the study focused 
on the attitudes of law enforcement personnel toward community-oriented policing 
within six municipal law enforcement organizations from the northeastern portion of the 
United States.164 The accreditation process is supported by community-oriented policing 
principles, thus the accreditation process should improve the personnel’s attitude toward 
the topic.165  
The study concluded that accreditation does not necessarily improve the 
professionalism of law enforcement personnel.166 Agencies seeking accreditation 
performed just as well, indicating that being accredited was not the catalyst for improved 
professionalism.167 It should be noted that both of these groups performed substantially 
better than organizations not seeking accreditation.168 Therefore, the mere fact that an 
organization is seeking accreditation will improve professionalism versus the actual fact 
of being accredited.169 The study also concluded that accreditation does improve the 
understanding of priorities between the organizational leadership and lower ranks.170 
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III. POLICY SAFEGUARDS 
This chapter examines various policy safeguards for highway interdiction to 
determine the consistency of implementation for guiding the actions of personnel and 
reiterating the legitimacy of the strategy. A focus group consisting of 11 supervisors from 
state police organizations nationwide provided the researcher with insight into policy 
safeguards implemented by their organization for controlling the actions of personnel 
conducting highway interdiction operations. In addition, the individuals have an average 
of 20 years of law enforcement experience, including 10 years as a supervisor. The total 
number of years of experience is 221 years.   
A. FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWS  
The researcher conducted focus group interviews with representatives from 11 
state police organizations throughout the United States who volunteered to participate in 
the research. One representative from each state police organization responded to 10 
topic areas associated with policy safeguards for conducting highway interdiction 
operations (see Appendix A). The researcher created 10 topics areas from the review of 
the available literature designed to solicit information from the focus group 
representatives on policy safeguards for highway interdiction implemented by their 
respective organization.  
1. Audio/Video Recordings to Document Police Action  
The first adaptation for video recording equipment to be installed in a police 
vehicle was by the Connecticut State Police in the 1960s.171 The equipment had severe 
limitations due to size and practicality but demonstrated the technology could be used by 
law enforcement for investigative needs.172 In the 1980s, innovations in technology made 
audiovisual recordings of traffic stops more practical because the equipment could 
readily be installed in patrol vehicles and was an affordable option for law enforcement 
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organizations.173 The technology was installed in patrol vehicles for the purpose of 
providing “as true and accurate depiction of events as is reasonably possible in order to 
provide the best possible evidence and documentation of events.”174 Efforts initiated by 
Mothers Against Drunk Drivers exponentially extended the use of mobile video 
recordings by law enforcement to record impaired driving associated with driving under 
the influence violations, enhancing the prosecution of individuals.175  
By the 1990s, law enforcement organizations participating in highway interdiction 
operations began implementing mobile video technology to record traffic stops to 
document the interactions of law enforcement with individuals stopped.176 This measure 
was particularly important for law enforcement personnel when recording consensual 
contacts, which resulted in individuals granting authority for law enforcement to search 
vehicles suspected of transporting illicit narcotics.177 As time progressed, the use of 
mobile video technology to produce audio and visual recordings of traffic stops expanded 
into protecting law enforcement organization from allegations of racial profiling and 
other inappropriate behavior.178 
The focus group confirmed the expansive utilization of mobile video technology 
by law enforcement personnel conducting highway interdiction operations. All 11 state 
police organizations participating in this policy analysis acknowledged that personnel 
with mobile video technology installed in their patrol vehicles are required to record 
interactions with individuals during traffic stops. Although all of the state police 
organizations utilize mobile video technology, the similarities begin to end at the 
implementation process. One state police organization advised that only a small 
percentage of patrol vehicles actually possess the technology, limiting its use for 
monitoring behavior of personnel. Additionally, the organization does not mandate video 
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recordings be reviewed by supervision. When the video recordings are reviewed, the goal 
of the reviews is more oriented toward leveraging training opportunities versus correcting 
inappropriate behavior.  
The remaining organizations utilize the technology to monitor behavior of 
personnel conducting traffic stops involving highway interdiction operations. Corrective 
actions taken as a result of reviews from video recordings have ranged from minor 
disciplinary proceedings to the most severe action, termination of the employee. 
Additionally, video recordings are reviewed by supervisors when the organization 
received a complaint, personnel achieve significant arrests, or an unusual incident occurs. 
The video recordings can also be used to identify positive behavior by personnel, which 
are reinforced through supervisor acknowledgment to personnel performing operations. 
The frequency of the monitoring video recordings varied among the organizations with 
the most frequently reviews conducted monthly. Some of the sporadic reviews only 
required supervision to monitor 40 hours of video recordings annually for each member 
with no specific timeframes identified.    
The focus group discussion on supervisors reviewing video recordings was 
expanded to determine if those supervisors possess experience with highway interdiction 
operations. The majority of the supervisors did possess some experience with highway 
interdiction operations; however, a significant number of organizations reported that 
personnel conducting highway interdiction operations may have their video reviewed by 
a supervisor with minimal or no experience with the techniques deployed by personnel to 
identify vehicles transporting illicit narcotics. If a supervisor does not understand the 
techniques, it would be difficult for him or her to identify the need for corrective action 
when inappropriate behavior is displayed. These reviews can also reveal problematic 
situations when the supervisor falsely accuses personnel with inappropriate behavior, 
which was in compliance with approved highway interdiction techniques. Therefore, it is 
beneficial if the supervisor reviewing the video recordings for highway interdiction 
operations actually possesses expertise in the strategy. 
Another unintended consequence identified during the discussion was the amount 
of time necessary for conducting the reviews of video recordings. As a result, only one 
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state police organization reviewed all traffic stops conducted by personnel performing 
highway interdiction operations. Some of the organizations reported that policy mandated 
a supervisor review at least one traffic stop per session containing a vehicle search or 
canine deployment. Table 2 illustrates the respective policy safeguards implemented by 
the state police organization participating in the focus group for audiovisual recordings of 
traffic stops.     
Table 2.   Policy Safeguards for Audiovisual Recordings of Traffic Stops 
State Police Agencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Audiovisual Recordings 
of Traffic Stops  
X X X X X X X X X X X 
Mandated Review by 
Supervision  
X X X X X  X X X X X 
Monthly Reviews    X X X   X X   
Quarterly Reviews  X         X  
Sporadic Reviews   X    X X     




  X X X X X X X  X 
Review All Traffic 
Stops 
      X     
Review One Stop with 
Vehicle Search or 
Canine Deployment 
  X    X   X  
 
2. Transparency of Traffic Stops 
The introduction to the Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing starts with a quote from President Barack Obama, who states, “When 
any part of the American family does not feel like it is being treated fairly, that’s a 
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problem for all of us.”179 The first pillar in the report emphasizes the need for law 
enforcement agencies to build trust within their communities through a “culture of 
transparency” supportive of the community viewing law enforcement organizations as 
legitimate.180 Thus, one strategy law enforcement organizations must explore is 
transparency in the decision-making process for personnel conducting highway 
interdiction operations.181  
As defined by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services report on 
procedural justice for law enforcement, transparency is “the processes by which decisions 
are made do not rely upon secrecy or deception.”182 When law enforcement personnel are 
transparent with their perceived justification for the decision-making process, community 
members are provided with an opportunity to comprehend and accept the justifications, 
even if they disagree with the information.183  
The focus group also addressed the issue of transparency by examining the 
policies implemented by state police organizations for highway interdiction that are 
designed to document the actions of personnel. Subsequently, a supervisor can review 
documentation by personnel conducting highway interdiction operations for supporting 
justification that guided the actions of personnel during the decision-making process. The 
group focused specific attention on the documentation of reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause that guided the actions of personnel to extend traffic stops into proving or 
disproving their suspicion of criminal activity. All of the state police organizations 
reported some manner of documenting justifications during traffic stops. The minimal 
standard requiring justification to be documented occurred when the decision-making 
process reached the conclusion to deploy a narcotics canine during a stop. In addition, the 
majority of the organizations specifically identified the requirement to document 
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justification for simply requesting consent to search a vehicle or actually searching a 
vehicle. In all cases, the information is forwarded to a supervisor for review. In a few 
instances, the justification is uploaded into an automated system that preserves the 
information for subsequent reviews when needed.   
The focus group expanded the conversation into concerns over discovery issues 
noting that the information documented will be subjected to the rules of discovery during 
criminal prosecutions. Personnel documenting the justification for actions taken during 
traffic stops must provide accurate and comprehensive information to convey the 
rationale behind the decision–making process. Shortcuts in documentation could be 
detrimental to the overall prosecution of criminal cases through the misinterpretation or 
deliberate manipulation of the available information as the case is presented in court.   
An additional unintended consequence of documenting justification for the 
decision-making process is identifying areas for improving performance. When 
reviewing the information documented, a supervisor is provided with the opportunity to 
identify weak performance and implement improvement strategies through informal 
counseling or traditional training. This activity can improve the understanding of 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause by personnel conducting operations and confirm 
their ability to articulate justification for actions. Table 3 illustrates the respective policy 
safeguards implemented by the state police organization participating in the focus group 
associated with the documentation for justifying the actions of personnel.      
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Table 3.   Policy Safeguards for Transparency by Documenting Justification of 
Personnel Actions 




Personnel Action  
X X X X X X X X X X X 
All Vehicle Searches 
or Consensual 
Requests  
X  X X    X X X X 
Reviews Conducted 
by Supervisor 




  X X  X  X X  X 
 
Law enforcement organizations have historically completed criminal investigative 
reports documenting when personnel engage in investigations for qualifying criminal 
events. The focus group discussed this process as another opportunity for personnel 
conducting highway interdiction operations to document the decision-making process to 
generate more transparency associated with police actions. The review of criminal 
investigative reports provides supervisors with an opportunity to comprehend the actions 
of personnel during highway interdiction operations resulting in criminal arrests. The 
documentation is designed to articulate why certain police actions were conducted during 
the encounter with an individual. Examples include reporting why an individual was 
stopped, items of interests observed, why they were suspicious, justification for searching 
the vehicle, and why an individual was detained, if applicable.  
The vast majority of focus group members stated that criminal investigative 
reports for personnel conducting highway interdiction operations were reviewed by a 
supervisor with highway interdiction experience. This review is a distinctive advantage 
for supervisors when seeking to comprehend the actions of personnel during highway 
interdiction operations. Supervisors with highway interdiction experience more readily 
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understand the evolving trends for drug trafficking organizations and how those trends 
might affect the decision-making process for personnel. The expanded knowledge also 
helps a supervisor with placing the information within the investigative report into proper 
context for evaluating the actions of personnel. Reviewing criminal investigative reports 
documenting police actions is the one area of policy safeguards that the vast majority of 
state police organizations exhibited some level of consistency and similarity in the 
application of policy.     
One state police organization reported that criminal investigative reports are 
reviewed by supervisors with little to no highway interdiction experience, and then they 
are reviewed by supervision with highway interdiction experience. As a result, 
conflicting instructions to interdiction team members has occurred as an unintended 
consequence. The supervisor with minimal highway interdiction experienced provided 
instructions that were not needed or unsupported by evolving case laws. Table 4 
illustrates the respective policy safeguards implemented by the state police organization 
participating in the focus group for procedures associated with reviewing criminal 
investigative reports.   
Table 4.   Policy Safeguards for Criminal Investigative Reports Completed 
State Police Agencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Criminal Investigative 
Reports Completed 
X X X X X X X X X X X 
Reviews Conducted 
by Supervisor 




 X X X X X X X X X X 
 
3. Controlling Discretion 
Those challenging the strategy of highway interdiction have recognized the 
difference between searches of vehicles based on probable cause and searches of vehicles 
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in which law enforcement personnel exercise discretion on whether or not to 
consensually request authorization to search a vehicle.184 Consensual searches are based 
on the principle of discretionary power granted to law enforcement personnel by their 
organization and supported by case law.185 In an effort to minimize the potential for law 
enforcement personnel to engage in racial profiling, law enforcement organizations have 
begun implementing strategies designed to limit the use of consensual requests to search 
vehicles.186 Civil rights advocates, such as the ACLU, have encouraged law enforcement 
organizations to deny personnel the ability to request consensual authorization to search 
vehicles absent of probable cause.187 In 2003, the California Highway Patrol barred 
personnel from conducting consensual searches of vehicles as a result of civil litigation 
against the organization.188   
The focus group also examined the discretionary powers entrusted to law 
enforcement personnel within the state police organizations for the purpose of 
determining what policies exist to control the use of discretion. The conversation 
centered on the discretionary use of consent for searching vehicles. All participating state 
police organizations confirmed that consensual search requests are documented, with 
specific emphasis on whether or not the request was granted. This practice preserves the 
response for court proceedings if criminal activity is identified during the search and 
prosecution pursued. 
The focus group conversation further explored the use of consensual searches and 
strategies deployed by state police organizations to limit the exercise of discretion. By 
policy, some of the state police organizations reported that their personnel are required to 
articulate at least reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before consensual request to 
search a vehicle can be asked. Personnel are prohibited from requesting consent unless 
the minimal standard of reasonable suspicion can be achieved. This additional policy 
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safeguard is beyond the standard requirements of consensual searches established through 
court rulings—for example, authority to authorize the search, knowingly consent, and 
voluntarily give consent. One state police organization reported that personnel are 
required to seek specific consent to search the trunk of a vehicle or locked container 
within the vehicle. Table 5 illustrates the respective policy safeguards implemented by 
the state police organization participating in the focus group for documenting requests 
associated with searches of vehicles stopped.  
Table 5.   Policy Safeguards for Documenting Responses to Request for Vehicle 
Searches 
State Police Agencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Document Response to 
Requests for Vehicle 
Searches  
X X X X X X X X X X X 
By Policy, Must Have 
at Least Reasonable 
Suspicion to ask for 
Consent  
 X  X  X  X  X X 
 
4. Statistical Data Collection for Traffic Stops 
The focus group explored the level of statistical data collection being gathered by 
the participating state police organizations and how that information is utilized to monitor 
the actions of personnel conducting highway interdiction operations. Though the majority 
of state police organizations reported gathering statistical data associated with the racial 
composition of drivers stopped by personnel for traffic violations, the manner by which 
the state police organizations monitor the statistical data varies drastically. Three 
organizations do not collect any statistical data associated with traffic stops concerning 
the racial composition of drivers, thus no monitoring can occur. One organization only 
reviews the racial statistical data of personnel when a complaint is filed. If a complaint is 
not filed, there is no review of the information.  
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None of the state police organizations reported a partnership with an academic 
institution that reviews the statistical data producing reports. Members of the focus group 
were aware of this happening in other states although no specific example was provided.  
Five of the state police organizations have supervisors review the statistical 
information to monitor the racial composition of drivers stopped by personnel. 
Interestingly, all five of them have also instituted internal benchmarking for comparison 
of racial statistical data associated with personnel conducting highway interdiction 
operations. Furthermore, they use peer group review to identify disparity among the 
group members for further exploration into the potential cause of the disproportionate 
numbers. The supervisors conducting the peer group reviews have experience with 
highway interdiction operations and familiar with their organization’s program.  
It should be noted that one of the three state police organizations that does not 
collect statistical data actually did collect the data in the past. The agency reviews of the 
statistical data did not reveal a bias, so it discontinued the practice.  
The focus group conversation expanded into unintended consequences identified 
with policies implemented for statistical data collection. Conversation revealed the 
process is time consuming and requires attention to detail for maintaining accuracy. This 
situation has resulted in law enforcement personnel spending time conducting 
administrative duties, thus reducing the amount of time available for highway interdiction 
operations. One state police organization has experienced significant interaction with the 
media, which required additional time and attention to properly manage. Table 6 
illustrates the respective policy safeguards implemented by the state police organization 
participating in the focus group for the collection of racial statistics associated with 
drivers stopped by law enforcement personnel conducting highway interdiction 
operations.      
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Table 6.   Policy Safeguards for Racial Statistical Data Collected by Personnel 
State Police Agencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Racial Statistical Data 
Collected by Personnel  














X  X X     X  X 
Academic Institutional 
Review of Statistical 
Data 
           
 
5. Calculations of Hit Rates  
Law enforcement personnel performing highway interdiction operations use a 
combination of skills, including training, experience, and observations to identify 
criminal activity, which is then substantiated through convictions in court.189 Individuals 
opposed to highway interdiction operations identify the low hit rates as empirical proof 
that the strategy is not only ineffective but creates an intrusion into the lives of 
community members.190 Hit rates are calculated by totaling the number of vehicles that 
law enforcement personnel search and identifying the percentage of searches resulting in 
contraband actually being seized.191   
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The focus group discussed hit rates although little information was revealed. Only 
one state police organization reported actually calculating the hit rates for personnel 
conducting highway interdiction operations. The organization further separated the 
information into two categories of consent and probable cause searches for determining 
successful seizures of contraband. The statistical information associated with hit rates is 
not examined beyond the seizure of contraband.  
Although all of the state police organizations documented what was being seized 
by personnel, none of them had an authoritative definition for hit rates beyond the seizure 
of contraband. Proactive law enforcement efforts by personnel conducting highway 
interdiction operations may not translate into successful seizures as hit rates are 
calculated. The group discussed several illustrations. One example discussed is when law 
enforcement personnel search a vehicle and discover an advanced hidden compartment 
for concealing contraband that is empty. The search does translate into a successful 
seizure for contraband, thus reducing the hit rate. The same may be true when law 
enforcement personnel correctly identify suspicious activity associated with a traffic stop; 
however, the contraband cannot be located or the individual involved in drug trafficking 
has not picked up the contraband yet. A suspended driver committing a criminal act while 
driving may display deceptive behavior but does not have contraband in the vehicle.  
All of these situations could negatively affect the hit rate although personnel 
conducting highway interdiction operations did properly identify suspicious behavior. In 
turn, concerns over low hit rates could negatively affect the commitment of personnel to 
continue performing highway interdiction. Table 7 illustrates the respective policy 
safeguards implemented by the state police organization participating in the focus group 
associated with reviewing statistical information for hit rates.  
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Table 7.   Policy Safeguards for Calculating Hit Rates of Personnel 
State Police Agencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Calculates Hit Rates of 
Personnel 
   X       X 
Established Criteria for 
Defining a Hit 
          X 
Separate Probable 
Cause and Consent for 
Hit Rates 
   X       X 
Hit Rates Reviewed by 
Supervision 
          X 
Hit Rates Reviewed by 
Supervisor with 
Interdiction Experience 
          X 
 
6. Selection of Personnel 
The professionalism and success of law enforcement organizations has long been 
attributed to the ability of those organizations to “select, train, and supervise its 
personnel.”192 It starts with the proper selection of personnel. Over the years, law 
enforcement organizations have developed extensive testing procedures to identify 
candidates to become law enforcement officers and join their ranks.193 The Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services within the Department of Justice sponsored a 
report entitled, Building Trust between the Police and the Citizens They Serve. This 
report mentions essential characteristics, such as honesty, integrity, and equity as 
elements of professionalism needed to foster trust between the police and members of the 
community.194 State police organizations conducting highway interdiction operations 
must ensure the right individuals are selected to participate in this specialized field. 
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Another topic explored by the focus group was the procedure used by the state 
police organizations to select individuals for conducting specialized highway interdiction 
operations. A significant majority of state police organizations reported an extensive 
process for selecting personnel for assignment on the specialized interdiction team. The 
process includes completing an application, reviewing their work history, an interview, 
and recommendations by supervision. These requirements are designed to identify the 
most qualified individual possessing essential characteristics, such as honesty, integrity, 
and equity along with a strong work ethic and ability to identify criminal activity.  
One organization reported the selection process is determined by seniority due to 
the binding contractual agreements with their union. Another state police organization 
reported personnel are utilized for the purpose of conducting specialized highway 
interdiction operations periodically throughout the year, thus controlling assignment to 
teams. The state police organizations are varied as to the number of years of law 
enforcement experience required prior to obtaining authorization to apply for the 
highway interdiction team. The highest requirement for experience with the organization 
was at least three years of experience before an application would be accepted. The 
majority of the state police organizations with a service mandate required at least two 
years of experience prior to qualifying to apply.       
All state police organizations participating in the focus group reported that 
personnel selected to join their organization’s highway interdiction team are offered 
specialized interdiction training to enhance their knowledge, skills, and abilities. Some of 
the state police organizations have developed in-house interdiction training programs to 
supplement training programs offered throughout the nation. The focus group identified, 
such training programs as Desert Snow195and the Drug Interdiction Assistance 
Program,196 as nationally recognized training programs providing advanced interdiction 
training.  
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However, only two state police organizations have identified mandatory training 
for personnel assigned to highway interdiction teams. The majority of state police 
organizations only provide advanced interdiction training when it becomes available 
versus mandating a specific course of action. Three of the state police organizations 
reported that newly assigned members must complete a 12-month probationary period to 
enhance training and determine if the individual is suited for the highway interdiction 
program. Table 8 illustrates the respective policy safeguards implemented by the state 
police organizations participating in the focus group for the selection of personnel 
assigned to their highway interdiction program.   
Table 8.   Policy Safeguards for Identified Procedures to Select Personnel 
State Police Agencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Identified Procedure 
to Select Personnel 
 X X X X  X X X X X 
Over 3 Years  X X    X     
2–3 Years     X  X  X X X  









of Courses  
  X      X   
Additional Cultural 
Diversity Training  
   X   X     
Additional Legal 
Courses 
X  X X      X  
Probationary Period     X   X   X 
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B. OVERALL SCORING OF POLICY SAFEGUARDS  
During the policy analysis, this researcher awarded points to the state police 
organization for each policy safeguard implemented associated with the protective 
measure identified. Additionally, each policy safeguard received three points for 
implementation. Two of the policy safeguards offered an opportunity to capture the 
thoroughness of the implementation by the state police organization. In addition, one to 
three additional points were awarded depending on the extent of implementation for the 
policy safeguard. The collected value for the policy safeguard implemented by each state 
police organization is recorded in Appendix B. The maximum potential score for fully 
implementing all of the policy safeguards identified was 96 points. The highest point 
value is 74 points for state police organization no. 11, and the lowest score is 36 points 
for state police organization no. 6. Figure 2 illustrates the points assessed for each state 
police organization participating in the focus group. 
Figure 2.  Policy Safeguard Scoring 
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C. CREATING PERCENTAGES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY 
SAFEGUARDS  
To compare the seven major categories of policy safeguards, the researcher 
calculated a percentage for each category to clarify the level of implementation by the 
state police organizations participating in the focus group. The researcher used the 
formula of A/B=C to calculate the percentage. Then, policy safeguard points for each 
category (A) was divided by the total number of potential points that could have been 
achieved in that category (B), resulting in a percentage for implementation of a policy 
safeguard category (C). Table 9 illustrates the percentages for the seven major categories 
of policy safeguards implemented by the respective state police organizations.  
The researcher further classified the percentages for implementation of the seven 
major categories established in Table 9 as high implementation (76 percent–100 percent), 
medium implementation (51 percent–75 percent), and low implementation (0 percent–50 
percent). This classification is to assist with the comparison of the policy safeguards 




Table 9.   Percentage of Implementation for Each Policy Safeguard 
State Police Agencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Avg 
Audiovisual Recordings of 
Traffic Stops  
44 39 83 67 67 39 94 67 67 61 56 62 
Transparency by 
Documenting Justification 
of Personnel Action 
75 50 100 100 50 75 50 100 100 75 100 80 
Criminal Investigative 
Reports Completed 
67 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 97 
Document Response to 
Requests for Vehicle 
Searches  
50 100 50 100 50 100 50 100 50 100 100 77 
Racial Statistical Data 
Collected by Personnel  
80 20 80 80 0 0 0 60 80 20 80 45 
Calculates Hit Rates of 
Personnel 
0 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 13 
Identified Procedure to 
Select Personnel 
33 29 71 67 48 24 57 52 52 52 48 48 
Average for Organization 50 48 69 79 45 48 50 68 64 58 83  
Implementation Rating             
High (76–100 ) 1 2 4 4 1 2 2 3 3 2 5 2.6 
Medium (51–75) 2 0 1 2 1 1 1 3 2 3 1 1.5 
Low (0–50) 4 5 2 1 5 4 4 1 2 2 1 2.8 
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D. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS  
At the conclusion of the focus group discussion, the group discussed two items 
that played a role in viewing highway interdiction as a legitimate strategy but were 
outside the realm of policy safeguards for highway interdiction identified in Appendix B. 
The first item was the role of law enforcement in the totality of the criminal justice 
system. Law enforcement personnel conducting highway interdiction operations do not 
operate in a vacuum. Rather, they are part of a criminal justice system built on a 
foundation of checks and balances for controlling the authority and legitimacy of 
government representatives. When law enforcement personnel identify criminal activity 
through highway interdiction operations, their actions are reviewed by prosecutors 
responsible for presenting criminal cases in court. Judges also evaluate the actions of law 
enforcement personnel to ensure the constitutional rights of defendants were respected 
and upheld. If the actions of law enforcement personnel are determined inappropriate 
during the process, the illegitimate behavior does not support a conviction in court. 
The group also mentioned the role of organizational culture supportive of 
developing core values within state police organizations as important for clarifying 
expectation of performance by personnel conducting highway interdiction. Policy 
implementation must be supported by leadership with a top-to-bottom approach 
emphasizing that inappropriate or illegitimate behavior will not be tolerated. Personnel 




IV. PERSONNEL COMPLAINTS 
Law enforcement organizations throughout the United States utilize personnel 
complaints to identify inappropriate behavior of personnel interacting with the public.197 
Sections, such as Internal Affairs, are created within organizations for the purpose of 
conducting investigations into “allegations of misconduct, corruption, inappropriate 
adherence to policies and procedures and to behavior, and matters so assigned by superior 
officers to ensure the professional integrity of the department and its members.”198 The 
manner by which these investigations are conducted is important for fostering trust 
between the community and law enforcement personnel conducting operations.199 
Individuals in the community desire to be heard when identifying police misconduct in 
support of reinforcing professional police services.200 In addition law enforcement 
personnel desire a system that treats them fairly when allegations surface.201 Complaints 
of police misconduct must be investigated “through fair, thorough, accurate, impartial 
investigations” to achieve the goals of each group.202  
Personnel complaints offer an opportunity for law enforcement organizations to 
track information to identify problematic patterns associated with the behavior of 
personnel conducting enforcement operations.203 When law enforcement organizations 
measure and analyze statistical data associated with complaints, early detection of 
problematic behavior can offer leadership of organizations the ability to address concerns 
vocalized by the community.204 Moreover, when law enforcement organizations 
implement corrective behavior during the early stages of detection, it can maintain the 
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integrity of the organization and reinforce desired behaviors.205 Furthermore, the 
complaint process should be accessible to the community with clearly defined procedures 
so community members understand and comprehend the fairness of the system.206 
A. DESCRIPTION OF STATISTICAL DATA COLLECTED 
The state police organizations participating in the focus group have all established 
procedures for members of the community to file complaints against personnel 
participating in highway interdiction operations. The policy safeguards discussed in 
Chapter III are designed to guide the actions of personnel while they perform traffic stops 
of vehicles traveling on the highways and to reinforce the legitimacy of highway 
interdiction as a strategy. When the interaction results in a problematic relationship, 
members of the community can file a complaint to have their concerns addressed.207  
For this thesis, researcher examined personnel complaints from three categories 
for the purpose of determining the professionalism of law enforcement personnel 
conducting highway interdiction operations. The literature review revealed allegations of 
racial profiling and the improper searching of vehicles were a significant concern voiced 
by critics of highway interdiction as a legitimate strategy; therefore, both categories were 
included.208 Unprofessional or rude behavior was also included in the statistical data 
because this criticism is applicable to all aspects of behavior for all law enforcement 
personnel whether assigned to routine patrol or highway interdiction operations.  
For the purpose of this thesis, the researcher collected all quantitative data for 
complaints filed against personnel in the three categories, regardless of the disposition of 
the allegation. The fact that an individual felt victimized by police misconduct is essential 
for the purpose of evaluating the relationship for trust between community members and 
actions conducted by law enforcement personnel. If a complaint is ultimately evaluated 
as unfounded or fabricated by leadership of the law enforcement organization, the 
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individual who filed the complaint feel as if he or she had been subjected to police 
misconduct. Therefore, the researcher included all complaints in the three categories in 
the evaluation process.  
B. DATA ORGANIZATION AND ANALYSIS 
The state police organizations participating in the focus group provided data 
associated with personnel complaints for the organization involving three categories of 
racial profiling, illegal searches, and rudeness. The information was further separated into 
two subcategories for analysis, the total number of complaints for personnel assigned to 
the organization’s highway interdiction program compared to personnel not assigned. 
There are other categories for complaints within these organizations; however, racial 
profiling, illegal searches, and rudeness are closely aligned with criticisms of highway 
interdiction programs. For that reason, personnel complaints analyzed for this thesis were 
restricted to the three categories.  
It should be noted that one individual could file multiple complaints stemming 
from a single encounter with law enforcement personnel conducting highway interdiction 
operations. For example, an individual could allege that law enforcement personnel 
illegally searched his or her vehicle and were rude during the encounter. These 
allegations could be counted as two complaints. If more than one law enforcement 
member was involved in the encounter, the complaints could be investigated against all 
the personnel involved in the encounter resulting in a higher complaint count. Each law 
enforcement organization independently determines how complaints are investigated and 
counted.    
The time period for statistical data varied between the state police organizations 
mainly due to requirements for gathering statistical data information by the Internal 
Affairs sections of the organization. State police organizations no. 3, no. 7, no. 8, and no. 
10 provided 2015 data. State police organization no. 4 provided the most recent data 
available, which was from 2014. State police organization no. 5 provided multiple years 
of data for 2013–2016. Figure 3 illustrates the total number of complaints filed for each 
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state police organization able to provide the statistical data associated with racial 
profiling, illegal searches, and rudeness.  
Figure 3.  Total Number of Complaints 
Five of the state police organizations could not produce the requested statistical 
data for separate reasons. State police organization no. 1 does not utilize the same 
personnel throughout the year to conduct highway interdiction operations. In 2015, that 
state police organization conducted 13 statewide highway interdiction operations 
deploying 303 troopers for 117 operational days. Due to the inconsistency in participation 
by law enforcement personnel, it would be impractical to include complaint information 
for this organization. 
State police organization no. 2 is similar to state police organization no. 1 in its 
assignment of personnel to its highway interdiction program. The organizations routinely 
assign additional personnel to highway interdiction operations for operational 
effectiveness, which limits their ability to track complaints based solely on conducting 
highway interdiction. Thus, the statistical information was not available. 
State police organizations no. 6 and no. 11 did not respond to requests for the 
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specific to individuals assigned to its highway interdiction program. The process to 
document complaints against personnel assigned to the highway interdiction program 
would require internal affairs staff to hand search files. The statistical information was 
not available.   
1. Analysis of Statistical Data for Allegations 
When examining the number of personnel complaints received by the state police 
organizations participating in the focus group, it is apparent that personnel conducting 
highway interdiction operations receive far fewer complaints as a total number received 
on the rest of the organization. The lower total amount of complaints can be explained by 
examining the relatively limited number of personnel assigned to the organization’s 
highway interdiction program. All of the state police organizations participating in the 
focus group had less than five percent of the organization’s law enforcement personnel 
assigned to their highway interdiction program. Therefore, the researcher further 
examined the statistical data for personnel complaints from each of the state police 
organizations who provided information to determine if the policy safeguards for 
highway interdiction helped minimizing the number of personnel complaints per 
individual received.  
Furthermore, the researcher explored the three categories of racial profiling, 
illegal searches, and rudeness to determine the number of complaints per individual for 
each complaint category as compared to the total number of law enforcement personnel 
for the two classifications—personnel assigned to the organization’s highway interdiction 
program compared to personnel not assigned. 
For example, if 100 troopers were assigned to the state police organization 
highway interdiction program (B), and the group received 15 complaints for rudeness 
(A), then the complaint percentage for rudeness would be .150 (C). A/B = C. This 
number does not necessarily mean that 15 members of the highway interdiction program 
received complaints. Members could receive more than one complaint throughout the 
period specified, causing the overall number of members receiving a complaint to 
decline. For the purpose of this thesis, the number of complaints per individual is a 
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mechanism to allow for comparing data across the different state police organizations and 
highway interdiction programs of various sizes. 
A = The number of complaints for a specific category. 
B = The number of personnel assigned to the group. 
C= Complaints per law enforcement officer associated with the group. 
The results for each of the state police organizations that provided data associated with 
personnel complaints can be found in Table 10.  
Table 10.   Complaint Rating for State Police Organizations 
State Police Organization No. 3 




Complaints per Non- 
Highway Interdiction 
Program Officer 
Total  .500 .076 
Racial Profiling Complaints .167 .015 
Illegal Searches Complaints .167 .005 
Rudeness Complaints .167 .056 
State Police Organization No. 4 




Complaints per Non- 
Highway Interdiction 
Program Officer 
Total  .022 .064 
Racial Profiling Complaints .022 .010 
Illegal Searches Complaints .000 .008 
Rudeness Complaints .000 .046 
State Police Organization No. 5 




Complaints per Non- 
Highway Interdiction 
Program Officer 
Total  .125 .073 
Racial Profiling Complaints .063 .014 
Illegal Searches Complaints .063 .013 
Rudeness Complaints .000 .046 
State Police Organization No. 7 








State Police Organization No. 3 




Complaints per Non- 
Highway Interdiction 
Program Officer 
Total  .455 .120 
Racial Profiling Complaints .046 .017 
Illegal Searches Complaints .227 .012 
Rudeness Complaints .182 .092 
State Police Organization No. 8 




Complaints per Non- 
Highway Interdiction 
Program Officer 
Total  .000 .010 
Racial Profiling Complaints .000 .000 
Illegal Searches Complaints .000 .000 
Rudeness Complaints .000 .010 
State Police Organization No. 10 




Complaints per Non- 
Highway Interdiction 
Program Officer 
Total  .143 .055 
Racial Profiling Complaints .071 .002 
Illegal Searches Complaints .000 .002 
Rudeness Complaints .071 .051 
 
2. Limitations 
As discussed in Chapter III, not all of the state police organizations participating 
in the focus group collect statistical data associated with traffic stops. This collection gap 
limits the researcher’s ability to examine traffic stops to determine which interactions 
resulted in a perception of unfair treatment or police misconduct as practically 
impossible. For example, one of the state police organizations in the focus group stopped 
12,031 vehicles in 2014 and received a total of two complaints. The number of 
complaints per traffic stop would be .0002. Because the state police organizations do not 
apply policy safeguards consistently, the researcher selected a common denominator 
between all of the state police organizations of personnel complaints for analysis. The 
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researcher analyzed the state police organization that stopped 12,031 vehicles in 2014 at 
.022 complaints per individual assigned to the highway interdiction program instead of 
the .0002 per traffic stop resulting in a personnel complaint.   
There are several other limitations that must be discussed when evaluating 
personnel complaints filed against law enforcement personnel conducting highway 
interdiction operations. An analysis of statistical data for complaints provided by the state 
police organizations indicated that very few individuals have filed complaints when 
encountering personnel assigned to highway interdiction programs. As previously 
discussed, the majority of highway interdiction programs have a relatively limited 
number of personnel assigned to the organization’s highway interdiction program, 
resulting in the low numbers of complaints. However, any complaint filed against law 
enforcement personnel conducting highway interdiction can have a significant impact on 
the number of complaints per individual for the year.  
For example, one of the state police organizations participating in study had one 
complaint of racial profiling filed for the year against law enforcement personnel 
conducting highway interdiction operations while the remaining members of the 
organization had 11. Due to the relatively small number of personnel in the highway 
interdiction program, the number of complaints per individual associated with the 
program was four times higher than the number of complaints per individual for the 
remaining members in the organization at 11. Leadership of the organization must 
understand that the disparity in the statistical data is just the beginning of comprehending 
the situation and that further information may be required. This situation is similar to 
Lorie Fridell’s assessment of clarifying statistical data associated with the racial 
composition of drivers stopped for traffic violations; disparity can be measured, but it is 
difficult to identify the cause of the disparity.209  
The low number of complaints filed against personnel conducting highway 
interdiction operations identified in the statistical data provided by the focus group could 
be overlooked by the leadership of the organization. One complaint for racial profiling 
                                                 
209 Fridell, By the Numbers, 27.  
 57 
may not gain the attention of leadership, obscuring its ability to grasp the situation. 
Thereby, the law enforcement organization would continue conducting highway 
interdiction operations without truly comprehending the potential negative effects of 
action undertaken by personnel conducting highway interdiction.  
Furthermore, the lack of situational awareness can become problematic when 
attempting to establish what the public perceives as legitimate behavior for highway 
interdiction operations. As with policy safeguards, all complaints do not have the same 
impact on the relationship between the law enforcement organization and the members of 
the community. The traffic stop involving Robert Wilkins in 1992 certainly affected 
operations of the Maryland State Police and resulted in a consent decree requiring policy 
modifications associated with racial profiling.210 Certainly, the number of complaints 
received is important to leadership for situational awareness, but a single complaint can 
have a significant impact. 
Another limitation for statistical data associated with personnel complaints relates 
to the community’s acceptance of the process for filing complaints. If community 
members do not feel they have a voice in the process, they will not file complaints 
expressing their concerns.211 In addition, community members may also fear retaliation 
from law enforcement in future interactions and avoid expressing their concerns.212 
Regardless the reason, the lack of involvement by the community in the complaint 
process can limit the effectiveness of law enforcement organizations to properly interpret 
the community’s concerns if they only rely on complaints.    
The inability of law enforcement organizations to provide clear and concise 
definitions of each category is another limitation for examining the total number of 
complaints. For example, a member of the community contacts the law enforcement 
organization to express concerns over the actions of personnel conducting enforcement 
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operations. Was the action of personnel in this incident rude or unsatisfactory job 
performance? The classification of unsatisfactory job performance would not be counted 
in this thesis for exploring personnel complaints to measure the effectiveness of highway 
interdiction. Unsatisfactory job performance complaints were eliminated from 
consideration because numerous actions by law enforcement personnel could be 
classified in this category that are unrelated to encounters with the public. 
A supervisor investigating the complaint has considerable discretion in reviewing 
the totality of the circumstances and categorizing the complaint. At times, the supervisor 
may determine that the circumstances surrounding the encounter between the community 
member and personnel involved does not warrant an administrative investigation, which 
results in no complaint filed. The supervisor could have concluded that the member of the 
community was contacting the law enforcement organization to gather more information 
for a better understanding of the circumstances instead of actually desiring to file a 
personnel complaint. Again, no complaint is filed.     
The final limitation for discussion is the missing information from the state police 
organizations unable to provide personnel complaint information for personnel assigned 
to conduct highway interdiction operations. Five of the state police organizations were 
unable to provide information associated with complaints for personnel assigned to their 
organization’s highway interdiction program. This situation has created a gap in the 
analysis of personnel complaints for highway interdiction and weakens the overall 





The evolution of policy safeguards such as audio and video recording of traffic 
stops demonstrates a transition in law enforcement from simply documenting evidence to 
capturing the totality of an encounter between law enforcement personnel and individuals 
stopped for traffic violations. Additional policy safeguards have been developed to 
document actions of personnel conducting highway interdiction operations to 
demonstrate more transparency in the decision-making process. As demonstrated in 
Figure 3 of Chapter IV, a low number of complaints are filed against personnel 
conducting highway interdiction operations as compared to the overall number of 
complaints filed in the state police organizations participating in the focus group.  As 
such, early warning tracking systems designed around complaints may not be the most 
effective strategy for alerting organizational leadership of potential problems concerning 
the appearance in legitimacy by citizens.  
Law enforcement organizations conducting highway interdiction operations must 
seek an effective strategy for implementing policy safeguards to guide the actions of 
personnel. In a study on bias-based policing conducted by Auburn University 
Montgomery, Center for Government and Public Affairs studying the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, researchers stated, “Far too frequently, the implementation and evaluation 
stages are ignored, people become distracted, other issues take center stage, there is a 
lack of commitment, and/or there always seems to be insufficient funds to complete the 
project.”213 So, what is available to help law enforcement organizations adapt an 
effective implementation strategy for policy safeguards associated with highway 
interdiction operations that is capable of addressing concerns? 
A. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 
The Civil Rights Division of the DOJ was created through passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1957 and was designed to protect the “civil and Constitutional rights of all 
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Americans.”214 The division is responsible to enforce federal law protecting the rights of 
Americans “on the basis of race, color, sex, disability, religion, familial status and 
national origin.”215 The U. S. attorney general was granted authority by Congress under 
42 U.S.C. § 14141 to initiate reforms of law enforcement organizations displaying 
undesirable behaviors through litigation.216 Within the Civil Rights Division, the Special 
Litigation Section conducts investigations of law enforcement organizations displaying 
“patterns or practices” of police misconduct violating the civil or constitutional rights of 
individuals.217  
In 2014 and 2015, the DOJ initiated two investigations into allegations of police 
misconduct centered on the controversial deaths of Michael Brown and Freddie Gray. 
DOJ published the investigation of the Ferguson Police Department on March 4, 2015 
and took approximately 18 months to complete identifying violations in the constitutional 
rights provided to citizens under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.218 The 
investigation into the Baltimore City Police Department took approximately 15 months to 
complete, and DOJ published it on August 10, 2016.219 In the Baltimore city 
investigation, the DOJ was able to sustain violations of the U.S. Constitution by law 
enforcement personnel conducting enforcement operations.220 Although the 
investigations analyzed all aspects of the two police departments, it is important to note 
the application of their findings to highway interdiction operations.  
In both investigations, the DOJ examined the practices of the police departments 
when engaging in traffic stops, searching vehicles, and making arrests. Additionally, the 
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DOJ examined the enforcement strategies deployed by each organization to determine the 
potential impact on members of the minority community. In Ferguson, DOJ examined 
statistical data associated with traffic stops conducted by police department personnel 
from 2010 to 2014 to identify the racial composition of drivers.221 A significant majority 
of drivers stopped by law enforcement personnel were black, accounting for 85 percent of 
the vehicle stops although the external benchmark for the black population of Ferguson 
was 67 percent.222 Black drivers were subjected to vehicle searches at a rate twice as high 
as white drivers, although black drivers were 26 percent less likely to be in possession of 
contraband.223 Interestingly, blacks accounted for 90 percent of the citations and 93 
percent of the arrests.224  
The DOJ also examined traffic stop data in Baltimore for the period of 2010 to 
2015.225 As in Ferguson, black drivers represented a significant percentage of drivers 
stopped at 82 percent.226 An external benchmark of 60 percent represents the black 
population in Baltimore city of driving age.227 The report acknowledged some of the 
difficulties associated with determining appropriate benchmarks for the black 
population.228 The racial percentage of drivers on a roadway varies due to the racial 
composition of the driving population living in particular areas of Baltimore or when 
drivers from other locations within the metropolitan area enter Baltimore.229 The DOJ 
determined the statistical data associated with vehicle searches to be “implausible” due to 
the exceptionally low search rate of 0.5 percent for vehicles stopped.230  
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Representatives from the Baltimore City Police Department acknowledged that 
search information is not accurately captured.231 Even so, the DOJ was able to calculate 
the hit rate for Baltimore City Police Department personnel to some degree considering 
the inconsistency in reporting.232 The hit rate for black drivers at 3.9 percent was half of 
the hit rate for other searches calculated at 8.5 percent.233 When the race of an arrestee 
was identified, blacks accounted for 86 percent of charges filed by Baltimore City Police 
Department personnel.234           
In both investigations, the DOJ examined statistical data and used it to examine 
the practices of the law enforcement organizations policing their respective communities. 
The report from the DOJ on the Ferguson Police Department was finalized on March 4, 
2015, and it stated, “Our investigation has revealed that these disparities occur, at least in 
part, because of unlawful bias against and stereotyping about African Americans.”235 The 
DOJ report also criticized Ferguson Police Department for participating in the city’s 
emphasis on asset seizure during traffic stops, generating revenue to meet budget 
shortfalls.236  
Similar criticisms have been alleged against law enforcement organizations 
conducting highway interdiction operations that seize currency as part of an asset 
forfeiture program.237 Finalized on August 10, 2016, the report from the DOJ on the 
Baltimore City Police Department stated, “There is reasonable cause to believe that the 
Baltimore City Police Department engages in a pattern or practice of conduct that 
violates the Constitution or federal law.”238 Moreover, the report identified the lack of 
supervisory oversight to guide the actions of personnel as a contributing factor “leading 
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directly to a broad spectrum of Constitutional and statutory violations.”239 Both reports 
identified negative effects on law enforcement’s relationship with the minority 
community, particularly on trust, as a result of abusive patterns or practices.   
The systematic problems identified in each report from the DOJ can have a 
significant impact on reforming the practices and patterns of the Ferguson and Baltimore 
City police departments. The DOJ report recommended many of the safeguards discussed 
in Chapter III as corrective measures for the Ferguson Police Department.240 These 
include increasing statistical gathering of stops, vehicle searches, and arrest data; 
requiring the actions of personnel be reviewed by supervision; implementing procedures 
to review statistical data on regular intervals; and analyzing racial compositions of drivers 
stopped by law enforcement to identify disparities or problematic patterns.241 The zero-
tolerance enforcement strategies have disproportionally targeted the minority community 
resulting in a deterioration of the relationship between the police department and the 
minority community.242 Finally, the report emphasized the need of the Baltimore City 
Police Department to improve community relationships through effective policing 
designed to enhance trust.243  
The DOJ has the ability to influence national standards for law enforcement 
strategies, such as highway interdiction; however, there are limitations. The DOJ has 
averaged three investigations each year with less than one full-scale investigation 
annually.244 Considering that there are more than 18,000 police departments in the 
United States, the effectiveness of the DOJ to collaborate and implement policy 
safeguards for highway interdiction as part of a nationwide strategy is limited.245 Full-
scale investigations simply require too much time to complete. Safeguards are part of the 
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recommendations by the DOJ, but they are narrowed to improve the patterns or practices 
of the law enforcement organization under investigation, specifically after the situation 
has deteriorated to the point that complaints are filed.  
B. END RACIAL PROFILING ACT  
In 1997, Michigan Congressman John Conyers, Jr. introduced a bill into the 105th 
Congress called the “Traffic Stop Statistics Act of 1997.”246 The bill was designed to 
“provide for the collection of several categories of data on each traffic stop, including the 
race of the driver and whether and why a search was performed.”247 One of the 
aspirations of the bill was to establish a nationwide platform for analyzing statistical data 
associated with traffic stops to determine if there is a disparity that supports accusations 
of racial profiling as expressed by the minority community.248 The act passed in the 
House of Representatives but as no action was taken in the Senate’s Judiciary Committee, 
so the bill died.249 Although the act did not pass, states were inspired to pass their own 
legislation requiring law enforcement organizations to gather statistical data associated 
with traffic stops.250 By 2007, 25 states passed legislation associated with statistical data 
from traffic stops conducted by law enforcement organizations.251  
Even though his proposed bill did not pass, Congressman Conyers has continued 
to pursue his efforts for requiring law enforcement to gather statistical data nationally.252 
In 2001, he proposed legislation known as the “End Racial Profiling Act,” which also has 
failed to pass.253 When the 114th Congress gathered in Washington, DC, Congressman 
Conyers reintroduced the End Racial Profiling Act on April 22, 2015.254 The act would 
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mandate safeguards such as statistical data gathering, grant sponsored training, and 
investigations of racial profiling allegations.255 Under the act, the U.S. attorney general 
would oversee the program and possess the authority to deny law enforcement 
organizations grant funding if the U.S. attorney general determines it appropriate.256 Due 
to budget restrictions negatively affecting operations, the ability to control grant funding 
can influence law enforcement organization throughout the nation.257  
Legislation has proven to be a difficult path for implementation of safeguards to 
guide the actions of law enforcement personnel. As previously noted, 25 states have 
passed legislation requiring law enforcement personnel to gather statistical data 
associated with traffic stops;258 however, the type of information collected varies from 
state to state. There is no national standard for collection or review of statistical data; 
therefore, the states collect information associated with traffic stops differently using 
standards, such as all traffic stops, when a citation is issued, an individual is arrested, or a 
vehicle is searched.259 Moreover, several states do not collect any statistical data at all.260 
This situation reflects the findings identified by the focus group when discussing how 
their organizations collect statistical data associated with highway interdiction operations. 
State police organizations are performing this task differently with varying abilities to 
identify disparities for comparison to external or internal benchmarking. 
C. ACCREDITATION 
Organizational accreditation through CALEA offers law enforcement 
organizations an opportunity to have policies and procedures reviewed for best practices 
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and evaluation of performance.261 This process could help establish a national standard 
for policy safeguards associated with highway interdiction operations, which could be 
used to minimize accusations of improper practices against personnel. However, there are 
some barriers to accreditation that may impede the ability to implement policy safeguards 
for highway interdiction operations.  
CALEA has a list of 463 standards for accreditation, and law enforcement 
organizations seeking accreditation must comply with all the mandatory standards, 
including 80 percent of “other-than-mandatory” standards, to receive the designation.262 
Bias-based policing is incorporated into CALEA standards under Standard 1.2.9 and 
requires law enforcement organizations to create reporting procedures to address the 
topic.263 These reports are designed to convey the organization’s efforts to prohibit bias-
based policing and improve transparency for law enforcement actions to the public.264 
Unfortunately, they do not directly focus on interdiction operations conducted on the 
highways. CALEA standard 52.1.5 addresses the requirement for law enforcement 
organizations to maintain annual reports for personnel complaints, as discussed in 
Chapter IV.265 Law enforcement organizations are required to compile information 
associated with personnel complaints and make the information publicly available along 
with personnel in the organization.266  
If policy safeguards for highway interdiction operations were implemented by the 
CALEA standards, it would simply be one of the 92 major categories currently 
undertaken by the law enforcement accreditation program.267 Additionally, the 
accreditation process is usually managed by mid- to upper-level management, potentially 
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weakening the impact of accreditation on first-line supervisors and personnel actually 
performing the tasks.268 It is essential organizations have effective communication 
clarifying priorities and organizational values for improving the comprehension of 
objectives by lower ranking personnel.269  
Consideration should also be given to the study conducted by Manual Teodoro 
and Adam Hughes, which highlights the potential problems with accreditation.270 Their 
study examined the effects of accreditation on the performance of law enforcement 
organizations and concluded that being accredited improved performance of 
organizations but organizations seeking accreditation were also able to demonstrate 
improved performance.271 The fact that a law enforcement organization is seeking 
accreditation might be good enough to improve professionalism as opposed to only 
improving performance subsequently to accreditation.272  
D. THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 
On December 18, 2014, President Obama issued Executive Order 13684 
establishing a task force on twenty-first century policing with the mission to “identify 
best practices and otherwise make recommendations to the President on how policing 
practices can promote effective crime reduction while building public trust.”273 The task 
force released its final report in May 2015, which emphasized the need to establish trust 
between law enforcement organizations and the communities they serve.274 More 
importantly, the task force created a national dialogue to discuss critical issues 
confronting law enforcement.275 Although the dialogue was focused on the profession of 
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law enforcement as a whole, organizations who participate in highway interdiction can 
apply the best practices it identified.  
As law enforcement engaged in the war on drugs targeting drug trafficking 
organizations and dealers who negatively affected citizens’ lives, the mindset of some 
law enforcement professionals shifted to incorporate a warrior mentality.276 Law 
enforcement organizations deployed resources in high crime areas to reduce crime 
through proactive law enforcement strategies known for as zero-tolerance approach when 
stopping and searching individuals to identify criminal activity.277 Citizens living in 
high-crimes areas with primarily minority populations felt law enforcement organizations 
were behaving like an “occupying force” instead of providing valuable services.278 The 
task force identified the need for law enforcement organizations to establish a mindset of 
a guardian protecting citizens while fostering a relationship supportive of law 
enforcement action and trust.279 This approach will help build a collaborative partnership 
with enhanced transparency and be complementary to viewing law enforcement strategies 
as legitimate.280   
The task force also addressed oversight recommendations affecting many of the 
policy safeguard protections associated with highway interdiction operations.281 The task 
force recommends that when encountering members of the community, law enforcement 
personnel need to be more transparent in the decision-making process so the motives and 
justification of law enforcement actions are apparent.282 These efforts must be 
accompanied by procedures for controlling discretion by law enforcement personnel, 
which will increase the perception of law enforcement actions as legitimate and fair by 
the public.283 Furthermore, this action will result in the public viewing law enforcement 
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personnel as a legitimate authority and most likely obey laws.284 The task force report 
also recommends law enforcement organizations cultivate organizational culture 
supportive of incorporating the principles of procedural justice with “doing the right 
things” so a collaborative partnership between law enforcement personnel and members 
of the community can flourish.285  
Training was another aspect well represented in the final report from the 
president’s task force, and there has been progress achieved toward this.286 Specifically, 
the task force recommended that law enforcement personnel undertake training to 
eliminate explicit and implicit biases from affecting the decision-making process when 
conducting law enforcement actions.287 Since the final report was published, law 
enforcement organizations have been participating in Fair and Impartial Training, 
sponsored by DOJ’s Community Oriented Policing Services Division.288 According to a 
principal instructor of the program, Anna Laszlo, the science based training demonstrates 
that “policing based on stereotypes and biases is ineffective, unsafe, and unjust.”289 
When left uncorrected, the same concerns that have been expressed by the minority 
community, as discussed in Chapter I, lead to allegations of police misconduct and racial 
profiling.290 On December 18, 2015, the White House reported that 50,000 law 
enforcement personnel have been trained on fair and impartial policing and procedural 
justice.291 
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The task force recognized that the recommendations needed an implementation 
strategy to have long-lasting impact on policing in the 21st century.292 A new initiative 
was launched within the DOJ Community Oriented Policing Services, called the Office 
of Policing Practices and Accountability Initiative, will be responsible for implementing 
the recommendations of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing.293 The 
federal government has provided funding of over $160 million dollars to law enforcement 
organizations for the implementation of recommendations associated with the task 
force.294 In addition, the Police Data Initiative was created to improve the “uses of data 
on police-citizen interactions that increase transparency, build community trust, and 
strengthen accountability.”295 Additional efforts have incorporated the Public Safety Data 
Portal to assist the public with understanding police oriented data and monitor law 
enforcement organizations participating in the Police Data Initiative.296 As of April 2016, 
53 jurisdictions nationwide are participating in the Police Data Initiative.297 
E. DOMESTIC HIGHWAY ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVE 
In 1988, Congress created the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) 
Program through the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.298 The program was placed in 
the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) under the Executive Office of the 
President with the specific strategy to “achieve the long-term goal of reducing drug 
trafficking and drug production in the United States.”299 Regional HIDTAs were created 
to facilitate collaborative partnerships with federal, state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement organizations to coordinate resources, share intelligence, and improve 
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operational effectiveness.300 Currently, there are 28 regional HIDTAs covering 63.5 
percent of the populations of the United States.301 For fiscal year 2017, the HIDTA 
program is budgeted to receive $196.4 million to fulfill its mission.302 
A discretionary enforcement project undertaken by HIDTA is the DHE 
initiative.303 The strategy of the initiative “is based on collaborative, intelligence-led 
policing to enhance coordinated, multi-jurisdictional operational law enforcement efforts 
on interstate highways specifically identified as drug trafficking corridors.”304 The DHE 
initiative remains focused on the operational effectiveness of law enforcement 
organizations conducting highway interdiction on the nation’s interstate system.305 
Assistance to highway interdiction programs is provided through funding of equipment, 
intelligence, and training. Annually, the DHE initiative sponsors a national interdiction 
conference to discuss critical issues confronting the strategy of highway interdiction 
accompanied with best practices supportive of maintaining the perception of the strategy 
as a legitimate law enforcement tactic.    
In 2014, leadership within the DHE initiative instituted proactive measures to 
affect the professionalism of law enforcement personnel conducting highway interdiction 
operations through the “21st Century Interdiction Code of Conduct”306 (see Figure 4). 
The code was created in response to complaints of police misconduct from alleged overly 
aggressive law enforcement tactics associated with asset forfeiture during highway 
interdiction operations involving currency seizures.307 The oversight measure was 
implemented to protect constitutional and civil rights of drivers being stopped by law 
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enforcement personnel.308 Kurt Schmid, HIDTA Director of the Chicago Office, 
emphasized the importance of highway interdiction associated with public safety but 
worried “some officers may be using the technique to pad local police budgets through 
forfeited proceeds rather than pursuing criminal cases or focusing on traffic safety.”309  
The 10 operating principles of the code of conduct stress the importance of law 
enforcement personnel recognizing their responsibility to perform highway interdiction 
operations at “the highest standards of integrity and ethical principles in the performance 
of traffic safety enforcement activities.”310 The code of conduct represents a clear 
indication from the DHE leaders that they are willing to implement protective measures 
to maintain perception of highway interdiction as a legitimate strategy for law 
enforcement organizations. 
Figure 4.  21st Century Interdiction Code of Conduct311 
 




311 Source: O’Harrow, Jr., “Federal Officials Issue New Code.”  
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1. Implementation 
As discussed in this chapter, transparency is a critical component of establishing 
trust between law enforcement organizations and the communities they serve.312 Law 
enforcement organizations are transforming toward a new philosophy of policing that 
will emphasize a mindset as a community guardian as opposed to that of a warrior against 
criminal activity.313 The culture of law enforcement organizations will play a vital role in 
the process as leaders determine the best course of action for improving relationships 
between personnel and the community.314 
Leadership of law enforcement organizations is capable of developing core values 
to clarify the expectation of performance by personnel.315 These core values guide the 
actions of personnel as an organization in respect for compliance with policies, 
procedures, and the law.316Law enforcement organizations with a professional 
organizational culture contain personnel supportive of the core values associated with 
positive institutional integrity.317  
The opposite is true for law enforcement organizations with troublesome 
organizational cultures. Personnel do not necessarily value compliance with policies, 
procedures, and the law as part of their daily activities318 (see Figure 5). The acceptance 
of the law enforcement organization’s core values by personnel conducting highway 
interdiction operations will affect the organization’s culture. In addition, personnel 
engaged in “doing the right thing” will increase trust between law enforcement 
organizations and the communities they serve.319    
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Figure 5.  Law Enforcement Organizations and Core Values 
 
 
The NAACP testified before the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 
that there is a “critical need to strengthen public trust and foster strong relationships and 
mutual respect between local law enforcement and the communities they protect.”320 
Video recordings have been proven to affect behavior of law enforcement personnel and 
citizens when those individuals realize their actions are being recorded.321 Video is just 
one policy safeguard to help improve transparency in the decision-making process to 
justify the actions of law enforcement personnel conducting highway interdiction 
operations. Other policy safeguards will have to be evaluated by organizational 
leadership to determine if implementation would be beneficial to the overall goal of 
improving community relationships as a guardian mindset materializes.   
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2. Synthesis of Implementation Strategies 
As previously mentioned, an implementation strategy is essential for the success 
of policy safeguards for highway interdiction operations to be effective over a sustained 
period of time.322 Poor execution of implementation strategies can occur when leaders 
ignore problems identified or simply do not have the fortitude to see the implementation 
phase through to completion.323 Each of the five implementation strategies previously 
discussed in this chapter have unique characteristics that can contribute to the overall 
success of highway interdiction being viewed as a legitimate strategy for law 
enforcement organizations in the United States. Unfortunately, none of them contain all 
of the characteristics needed guide the actions of highway interdiction personnel on a 
daily basis; however, each of them can contribute to the process of envisioning a new 
course of action for highway interdiction operations.  
The most extensive reviews of police misconduct are conducted by the DOJ’s 
Civil Rights Division, as demonstrated by the comprehensive reports filed on the police 
departments of Ferguson and Baltimore. The full-scale reviews encompassed numerous 
aspects of enforcement actions undertaken by the law enforcement personnel to identify 
patterns and practices associated with law enforcement action. During the reviews, DOJ 
personnel interacted with members of the police community, citizens living in the 
affected areas, elected officials, civic and religious leaders, and members of advocacy 
groups.324 The reviews also included ride-alongs to monitor the interactions of law 
enforcement personnel with the community.325 This characteristic is important to include 
with implementation strategies for policy safeguards guiding the actions of law 
enforcement personnel conducting highway interdiction operations. Through 
communication with leaders representing various aspects of society, problems can be 
identified, ultimately leading to potential resolutions.326   
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Another important characteristic of the DOJ review included the analysis of 
statistical data to identify disparities in enforcement practices of the police departments 
investigated. The analysis of the statistical data was supported by efforts to determine the 
cause of the disparity and concludes that racial stereotyping and bias-based policing 
contributed to the problems.327 The DOJ review of Baltimore mentioned the lack of 
policy safeguards as creating an atmosphere of abusive law enforcement practices by 
personnel conducting enforcement operations when interacting with the community.328 
The next two implementation strategies have limited application to maintaining 
the perception of highway interdiction as a legitimate law enforcement practice. Although 
the bill has never passed, the End Racial Profiling Act demonstrates the importance of 
maintaining a dialogue for identifying minimum safeguards through legislation 
mandating compliance from law enforcement organizations. The citizens should be able 
to decide through constitutional representation what safeguards are necessary to protect 
their civil and constitutional rights. Several state and local jurisdictions have already 
implemented such laws for their protection.329  
The accreditation process demonstrates that law enforcement organizations are 
willing to seek official designation as being capable of identifying national standards for 
performance.330 The accreditation process is designed to identify if law enforcement 
organizations are complying with policies involving nationally recognized best 
practices.331 Additionally, the accreditation process is capable of conveying what is 
important to the organizational leadership so lower ranks can comprehend organizational 
values to obtain compliance with policies.332 
The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing has several characteristics 
that should be considered as part of an implementation strategy for highway interdiction. 
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First, law enforcement organizations must embrace the guardian mentality discussed in 
the final report and engage the community in an honest dialogue about protecting 
citizens.333 This needs to be a collaborative partnership capable of producing meaningful 
conversations and potential solutions to problems.334 Secondly, the final report from the 
task force emphasized numerous policy safeguards.335 They included transparency in the 
decision-making process, controlling use of discretion by law enforcement personnel, 
collecting statistical data, establishing a professional organizational culture, and 
providing training to eliminate explicit and implicit biases.336 All of these characteristics 
are important for the strategy of highway interdiction operations to be viewed as a 
legitimate strategy by the community. Lastly, the work of the task force has continued 
with two initiatives that can help implement policy safeguards for highway interdiction, 
the Office of Policing Practices and Accountability Initiative and the Police Data 
Initiative.337 
All of the implementation strategies previously discussed in this section address 
law enforcement operations from the entirety of the profession. Only the DHE initiative 
is focused specifically on law enforcement personnel responsible for conducting highway 
interdiction operations. Additionally, many of the law enforcement organizations with 
highway interdiction program already participate in a collaborative partnership with the 
DHE initiative, sharing information to enhance operations. For those reasons, it is 
recommended that the DHE initiative continue to embrace the responsibility for highway 
interdiction conducted on the highways of the United States. The focus of the DHE 
initiative should to be expanded from operational considerations to incorporate 
supervisory oversight when addressing the aspects identified by the President’s Task 
Force on 21st Century Policing. The DHE is already managed through the HIDTA 
program within the Office of National Drug Control Policy for the Executive Office of 
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the President.338 The ongoing efforts of the President’s Task Force can easily be 
coordinated with the DHE initiative to address concerns by the minority community 
involving highway interdiction to improve transparency and trust. The DHE initiative has 
already demonstrated a willingness to implement policy safeguards specifically designed 
for highway interdiction through the creation of the code of conduct.339  
Another important characteristic for the DHE initiative is its willingness to 
address critical issues confronting the strategy of highway interdiction. Each regional 
HIDTA has a director for the DHE initiative who communicates with leadership of 
interdiction programs within his or her area of responsibility. As a result of the 
collaborative partnerships previously established, the DHE initiative is able to understand 
the complexities of highway interdiction at the same level the DOJ Civil Rights Division 
comprehends the critical issues confronting the police departments in Ferguson and 
Baltimore. This extensive comprehension will allow the DHE initiative to identify policy 
safeguards specifically designed for highway interdiction, which will help maintain the 
view of the strategy as legitimate. The national platform will also assist with the 
distribution of information to establish a national standard for best practices and 
potentially develop an accreditation process for highway interdiction.      
Annually, the DHE initiative can convey essential policy safeguards for highway 
interdiction programs throughout the nation as leaders gather for to participate in the 
national conference hosted by the initiative. In the past, the DHE initiative has provided 
an opportunity for the ACLU and other advocacy groups to speak at the national 
conference to communicate concerns and address issues. The DHE initiative is an 
existing program already possessing substantial resources within the HIDTA budget for 
fiscal year 2017. Incorporating the ability to champion policy safeguards for highway 
interdiction is a natural fit and could be easily accomplished. 
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3. Evaluation of Policy Safeguards
Policy safeguards possess comprehensive characteristics and may not have the 
same desired effect of improving transparency for justifying law enforcement action as 
perceived by the community the organization serves. Additionally, the DHE initiative 
does not possess compulsory authority over law enforcement organizations conducting 
highway interdiction operations throughout the nation. Therefore, the leadership of law 
enforcement organizations will need to evaluate the effectiveness of policy safeguard by 
deploying a business process simulation with “as-is” or “to-be” models.340 Researcher 
Andrew Greasley describes this process as incorporating four steps involving the creation 
of a process map, evaluation of the process (as-is), developing modification to the 
process (to-be), and implementation of needed modifications.341  
The process map is a simplified analysis of how work is accomplished and how 
the different aspects of a task are connected to one another (see Figure 6).342 The 
evaluation of the process in step two provides leadership with an understanding of the 
current situation and how the process affects factors such as performance for determining 
value to the organization.343 Step three is an exploration into how things could be 
changed impacting the overall process through modifications.344 The final step allows for 
implementation using the previous step as a blueprint for needed modifications if the 
decision requires the organization to transition from the “as-is” model to the “to-be” 
model.345  
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Figure 6.  Decision Making Process for Law Enforcement346 
Figure 6 illustrates the decision-making process for law enforcement organization 
with a professional or troublesome organizational culture using the “as-is” or “to-be” 
process when deciding if a policy safeguard should be implemented. The leadership of 
the organization will review how things work and identify the different aspects connected 
to the relationship with the community.347 The next step requires the leadership to review 
the organization’s relationship with the community for determining if the organization 
346 Adapted from: U.S. Department of Justice, Implementing a Body-Worn Camera. 
347 Greasley, “Using Business‐process Simulation,” 413–414.  
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possesses a professional or troublesome core organizational culture.348 In this example, 
the modifications required to implement a policy safeguard is measured against the value 
for that safeguard to affect community relations.349 If the organizational leadership 
perceives value in the policy safeguard, then the policy safeguard will mostly likely be 
implemented as “to-be.”350  
An organization with a professional organizational culture can enhance its 
community relationship by implementing policy safeguards designed to improve 
transparency and trust.351 An organization with a troublesome organizational culture can 
also improve their relationship by implementing the policy safeguard designed to 
enhance transparency and trust.352 As reported by the President’s Task Force 21st 
Century Policing, these characteristics are essential for law enforcement to be viewed as 
legitimate by members of the community.353 Conversely, if the value of the policy 
safeguard is valued less than the modifications, then the policy safeguard will most likely 
not be implemented, and the organization will maintain the “as-is” model.354      
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis was designed to answer the question as to whether or not policy 
safeguards could help minimize improper practices by law enforcement personnel 
conducting highway interdiction operations. Law enforcement organizations have not 
created policy safeguards for highway interdiction from a strategic plan anticipating the 
deployment of resources to conduct operations. In fact, law enforcement organizations 
have created many of the policy safeguards retroactively and implemented as a 
mechanism to mitigate identified problems with the strategy of highway interdiction, 
such as complaints of police misconduct or the public’s perception of unfair law 
enforcement practices.  
The researcher conducted a review of the research indicating that supervision of 
highway interdiction programs is being done differently throughout the country. Figure 2 
illustrates the vast disparity existing between the state police organizations participating 
in the focus group. State police organization no. 6 scored a rating of 36 points out of a 
potential score of 96 points. Five other state police organizations had a rating in the range 
of 40–49 points. Then, the point range increased substantially with three state police 
organizations accumulating at least 59 to 66 points. In addition, two state police 
organizations scored a rating of 71 points or higher with the top rating at 74 points. The 
vast difference in the point range is evident of the inconsistent level of implementation 
among the 11 state police organizations participating in the focus group. None of the state 
police organizations have yet fully implemented the policy safeguards identified in the 
policy reviews and focus group discussions. 
A. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
Personnel complaints are one of the mechanisms that law enforcement 
organizations utilize to identify inappropriate behavior when personnel interact with the 
public.355 This thesis focuses in the area of three categories for personnel complaints, 
racial profiling, illegal searches, and rudeness. Figure 3 illustrates the relatively low 
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number of total personnel complaints filed against personnel assigned to state police 
highway interdiction programs in comparison to the remaining members of the 
organization. State police organization no. 7 had the highest number of complaints at 10 
for personnel assigned to its highway interdiction program while the rest of the 
organization had a total number of 114. It should be noted that state police organization 
no. 5 actually submitted data for the period of 2013–2016 and did not reach a total of 10 
complaints. State police organization no. 8 did not have any complaints filed against 
personnel conducting highway interdiction operations and the rest of the organization had 
a relatively low number of 14 complaints. This phenomenon is partially explained by the 
requirements for establishing a complaint as opposed an individual simply seeking 
clarification of a situation, as discussed in Chapter IV. 
Although it is important for leadership of law enforcement organizations to 
understand the number of complaints filed against personnel assigned to the 
organization’s highway interdiction program, the low number of complaints filed does 
not necessarily convey the relative information for an overall awareness of the situation. 
All of the state police organizations participating in the focus group had less than five 
percent of the personnel assigned to their highway interdiction program. Hence, the 
expectation would be a lower number of personnel complaints filed annually.     
A comparative analysis is required between the relationship in the totality of 
policy safeguards implemented and the number of personnel complaints filed in the state 
police organizations participating in the focus group. Table 11 illustrates the number of 
complaints per individual in the organization compared to the number of complaints for 
each individual specifically assigned to highway interdiction programs. Only two of the 
state police organizations had a lower number for complaints per individual assigned to 
the organization’s highway interdiction program when compared to the rest of the 
organization. Additionally, each of the two organizations also had at least 59 points 
associated with policy safeguard implementation. The state police organizations with 49 
points or lower all had a higher number of personnel complaints per individual assigned 
to the highway interdiction program when compared to individuals not assigned.    
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When examining the total points for the implementation of policy safeguards, the 
largest gap in implementation is between the state police organizations with 59 points and 
state police organizations with 49 points. The gap is 10 points and is not duplicated at any 
other level in the implementation process. The gap also represents the level in which the 
highway interdiction programs begin to surface with a lower number of personnel 
complaints per individual than the rest of their organization. The implementation of 
policy safeguards associated with conducting highway interdiction might contribute to 
the effectiveness of highway interdiction by minimizing the number of personnel 
complaints filed against personnel performing enforcement operations. This phenomenon 
is not conclusive. One of the state police organizations with 66 points also had a higher 
number of complaints per individual for personnel assigned to its highway interdiction 
program.  
When examining the percentages for the implementation of policy safeguards in 
Table 9, the two state police organizations (no. 4 and no. 8) had a lower number of 
personnel complaints per individual assigned to the organization’s highway interdiction 
program and were the only organizations with a least six categories rated medium to high 
for implementation. They were also the only two organizations that provided personnel 
complaint information with a least three categories and scored 100 percent on 
implementation rating.  
Through this analysis, the benefits of implementing policy safeguards can be 
supportive for assisting the strategy of highway interdiction although not conclusive. 
State police organization no. 3 had five categories rated medium to high for 
implementation, including four rated at high implementation. The rating for organization 
no. 3 also only missed the medium rating by one percentage point associated with the 
implementation of responses to request for vehicle searches. State police organization no. 
3 had more categories rated at high than state police organization no. 8. Thus, simply 
implementing policy safeguards in this fashion will not guarantee a lower number of 
personnel complaints per individual for the law enforcement organization’s highway 
interdiction program. Table 11 provides an overview of the three ratings provided for 
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each state police organizations that furnished personnel complaint information for this 
study. 
Table 11.   Combined Ratings for the State Police Organizations 
 Policy Safeguard 
Rating 
Complaint Rating Implementation Rating 
HIP Non-HIP H M L 
No. 3 66 .500 .076 4 1 2 
No. 4 71 .022 .064 4 2 1 
No. 5 40 .125 .073 1 1 5 
No. 7 47 .455 .120 2 1 4 
No. 8 59 .000 .010 3 3 1 
No. 10 49 .143 .055 2 3 2 
 
A stronger argument for the benefits of implementing policy safeguards can be 
achieved by analyzing the number of times a state police organization exceeded the 
average for policy safeguard implementation by the state police organizations 
participating in the focus group. Specifically, the average for each of the seven major 
categories of policy safeguards as outlined in Table 9. State police organization no. 4 was 
the only organization to exceed the average implementation in all seven major categories, 
while state police organization no. 8 exceeded the average six times. State police 
organization no. 3 only exceeded the average five times while the remaining 
organizations that provided data for personnel complaints were only able to achieve this 
standard two or three times. State police organizations exceeding the average 
implementation of policy safeguards at least six times were able to achieve a HIP 
complaint rating of less than .025 complaints per individual assigned to the organizations 




Figure 7.  Safeguard Implementation for Full Set versus HIP Complaint Rating 
State police organization no. 3 exceeded the average implementation five times 
but still has a high HIP complaint rating. This phenomenon can be partially explained by 
the relatively small number of personnel assigned to the highway interdiction program for 
state police organization no. 3, which was the smallest program in the study. The second 
smallest highway interdiction program in the study was slightly less than three times 
bigger than state police organization no. 3. Therefore, a single complaint of police 
misconduct will significantly impact state police organization no. 3 as compared to the 
remaining five state police organizations, which have larger highway interdiction 
programs.  
There are numerous limitations when discussing personnel complaints and 
determining the legitimacy of highway interdiction as a law enforcement strategy. Five of 
the state police organizations participating in the focus group were not able to produce 
statistical data for personnel complaints filed against personnel assigned to the highway 
interdiction program in their organization. The six state police organizations that produce 

























Org #10 Org #5 
88 
apparent that the information is not readily available nor regularly reviewed by 
supervision of highway interdiction programs. This void creates a lack of situational 
awareness for supervision regarding the overall number of personnel complaints 
generated against personnel assigned to the highway interdiction program.  
B. EVALUATION FOR THE FEASIBILITY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION 
PLAN 
A component of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing was to 
“promote effective crime reduction while building public trust.”356 Although not 
conclusive, the implementation of policy safeguards for highway interdiction operations 
can assist to achieve that goal. Highway interdiction operations are capable of producing 
tangible results through arrests of individuals engaged in criminal activity, such as 
terrorism, distribution of dangerous drugs, and human trafficking. State police 
organizations, such as no. 4 and no. 8 studied in this thesis, have produced lower number 
of personnel complaints per individual assigned to their highway interdiction program as 
compared to the rest of their organization.  
A weakness of the policy safeguards is the manner by which most of personnel 
complaints were created. The majority of the policy safeguards were created to address 
specific problems, such as accusations of racial profiling and police misconduct, as 
opposed to being part of a national strategy to identify and arrest individuals engaged in 
significant crimes. Absent of guidance from a national strategy perspective, each law 
enforcement organization engaging in highway interdiction is developing policy 
safeguards on its own for supervising its program. This situation has resulted in a 
disparity for the level of implementation of policy safeguards by law enforcement 
organizations deploying resources conducting highway interdiction operations. Thus, the 
building of public trust in the strategy of highway interdiction remains problematic as 
individuals in the community question tactics being used by law enforcement personnel.  
The research associated with this thesis highlights the need for law enforcement 
organizations to reduce the disparity in implementation of policy safeguards for law 
356 U.S. Department of Justice, President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 1. 
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enforcement organizations conducting highway interdiction operations. The current 
situation makes it difficult for researchers to definitively identify the impacts of policy 
safeguards on the strategy of highway interdiction. This thesis recommends that 
HIDTA’s DHE initiative under the ONDCP champion the cause for supervision of 
highway interdiction programs through the establishment of necessary minimum 
standards for policy safeguards to guide the actions of personnel. Specifically, the DHE 
initiative must affect the core values of law enforcement organizations deploying 
personnel conducting highway interdiction operations, as specified in Chapter V, to 
ensure organizations embrace a professional organizational culture. The DHE initiative, 
in a collaborative partnership with community leaders and leadership of highway 
interdiction programs, can provide the neutral perspective needed for open and honest 
conversation while still understanding the technical aspects associated with specialized 
units conducting highway interdiction. The standardization of policy safeguards for 
highway interdiction programs throughout the country will help establish more 
transparency and understanding of tactics used by personnel to identify and minimize the 
negative effects of criminal activity.   
On July 12, 2016, President Barack Obama spoke at the memorial service for five 
Dallas police officers who were killed in the line of duty. He stated,  
Our entire way of life in America depends on the rule of law; that the 
maintenance of the law is a hard and daily labor; that in this country, we 
don’t have soldiers in the streets or militias setting the rules. Instead, we 
have public servants, police officers.357  
The national dialogue started by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing was 
the catalyst to initiate a conversation between law enforcement leaders and the 
community they serve concerning acceptable tactics for enforcing the laws of this nation. 
The DHE initiative is the instrument to achieve that goal.      
                                                 
357 White House, “Remarks by the President at Memorial Service for Fallen Dallas Police Officers,” 
press release, July 12, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/12/remarks-president-
memorial-service-fallen-dallas-police-officers.  
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C. OBJECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
The policy safeguards implemented by law enforcement organizations deploying 
personnel to conduct highway interdiction operations were designed from the perspective 
of law enforcement. As articulated in Chapter I, criticism of highway interdiction 
operations includes allegations of racial profiling, illegal searches, and other forms of 
police misconduct. More research is needed on the impact of policy safeguards 
contributing to the effectiveness of highway interdiction as a legitimate strategy. 
Something is happening in two state police organizations at the level of implementation 
for a rating of at least 59 points that has allowed them to produce lower number of 
personnel complaints per individual against members conducting highway interdiction 
operations. This phenomenon is supported by the realization that those organizations also 
had six categories for implementation of policy safeguards at the medium to high rating 
and exceeded the average implementation at least six times. Simply implementing policy 
safeguards is not a guarantee for lower number of personnel complaints per individual 
associated with complaints for personnel conducting highway interdiction operations, as 
demonstrated by state police organization no. 3.    
The latest statistics from the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported the law 
enforcement in the United States stopped 21.2 million vehicles in 2011.358 At first 
glance, the minimal number of complaints would suggest that the problem associated 
with highway interdiction operations is minor; however, the frustrations articulated by 
civil liberty organizations and members of the minority community tell us otherwise. 
Law enforcement organizations do not necessarily have a mechanism that can capture the 
true extent of the problem specific to highway interdiction operations.  
The focus group was restricted to state police organizations with highway 
interdiction programs. Larger organizations, such as state police, tend to have more 
policy and procedures established to guide the actions of personnel conducting 
enforcement operations. There are more than 18,000 police departments in the United 
                                                 
358 Langton and Durose, Police Behavior, 3.  
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States, with the most police departments employing 10 or fewer police officers.359 
Smaller police departments were not included in the study, and their inclusion might have 
affected the ratings for implementation in comparison to the number of personnel 
complaints received.  
Policy safeguards for highway interdiction beyond the knowledge of the focus 
group were not included in this study. Participation in the focus group was solicited; 
unfortunately, not all of the organizations responded. This situation created a gap in 
knowledge that could have expanded on the number of safeguards implemented to guide 
the actions of personnel conducting highway interdiction operations. Although the 
research conducted an extensive literature review, not all aspects of supervising highway 
interdiction programs were captured for review and discussion by the focus group. 
Additional research must be conducted in the area of calculating hit rates for 
determining the effectiveness of highway interdiction operations. Currently, the literature 
available of the topic only uses the seizure of contraband as a measurement for a 
successful stop. As we have discovered, transparency associated with the actions of law 
enforcement personnel performing enforcement operations is important. It is just as 
important to recognize successful highway interdiction stops that discovered hidden 
compartments for smuggling contraband, however, empty at the time of the traffic stop. 
Law enforcement personnel should not view those stops as a negative interaction with the 
public. Rather, they should view these stops as opportunities for good police work to 
identify individuals engaging in criminal activity. Transparency in defining hit rates for 
successful traffic stops is important to properly calculate the positive results from 
personnel searching vehicles. 
Supervision of highway interdiction programs at the national level has not been 
thoroughly discussed from a strategic perspective. This situation has created a gap in 
awareness of the policies being implemented by other law enforcement organizations. 
Several of the state police organizations participating in the focus group have begun 
implementing additional policy safeguards identified in Chapter III. As the additional 
                                                 
359 U.S. Department of Justice, National Sources of Law Enforcement, 3.  
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policies get implement, research needs to be conducted to determine the impact on the 
number of personnel complaints filed against personnel. Hopefully, the implementation 
of additional policy safeguards will help identify a better standard for determining the 
effectiveness of policy safeguards to improve the strategy of highway interdiction 
operations.     
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APPENDIX A. FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Topic 1 
By policy, does your organization mandate audio and visual recording of traffic 
stops? If so, does a supervisor routinely review the video recordings to identify potential 
violations of department policy, procedures, or applicable laws? What unintended 
consequences or problems have surfaced from the reviews? Is the supervisor reviewing 
recordings directly involved with highway interdiction operations? Are all traffic stops 
reviewed?  
Topic 2 
By policy, are personnel conducting highway interdiction operations required to 
document justification for actions undertaken during the traffic stop? For example, why 
they exercised discretion to ask for consent to search a vehicle? If so, how is the 
information documented? Does a supervisor routinely review the documentation? Is the 
supervisor reviewing the documentation directly involved with highway interdiction 
operations? What unintended consequences have emerged from the process?   
Topic 3 
Are personnel conducting highway interdiction authorized to conduct consensual 
searches of vehicles? By policy, does your organization place limitations on consensual 
searches of vehicles? If so, what limitations are in place?   
Topic 4 
By policy, does your organization mandate the collection of statistical data 
associated with the racial composition of drivers stopped? If so, does a supervisor 
routinely review the statistical data? What problems have been identified with the 
process? Is the supervisor reviewing statistical information directly involved with 
highway interdiction operations? What information is being obtained from the review? 
Are internal comparisons conducted with other members performing highway 
interdiction operations? Have you encountered any unintended consequences? 
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Topic 5 
By policy, does your organization calculate the percentage of traffic stops 
resulting in a seizure of contraband or an arrest for criminal activity commonly referred 
to as “hit rates”? What qualifies as a successful hit? When calculating the hit rate, are 
probable cause searches separated from consensual searches? If so, does a supervisor 
routinely review the statistical data? Is the supervisor reviewing the calculations directly 
involved with highway interdiction operations? What information is being obtained from 
the review?  
Topic 6 
By policy, are complaints of police misconduct, racial profiling, or rudeness 
documented and thoroughly investigated? If so, is the investigation conducted by 
individuals independent of the highway interdiction program? Are complaints reviewed 
by supervision assigned to the highway interdiction program for endorsement/comment?  
Topic 7 
By policy, how are personnel selected for assignment to specialized interdiction 
teams? What criteria are used? Are personnel mandated to attend highway interdiction 
training? If so, are the training programs standardized for all personnel assigned to 
specialized highway interdiction teams? Are personnel required to attend additional 
cultural diversity/awareness training? Are personnel required to attend additional legal 
courses?  
Topic 8 
By policy, are criminal investigative reports reviewed by a supervisor for 
compliance with policy, procedures, and applicable laws? How many layers of 
supervision review the reports? Are the reviewing supervisors specially trained in 
highway interdiction? Do supervisors attend training specifically designed for 
supervision of highway interdiction operations? What problems have been identified 




By policy, are highway interdiction operations directly supervised? What is the 
span of control for each supervisor associated with the number of individuals managed? 
How does the ratio compare to other operations within your department?  
Topic 10 
What other techniques does your department use to avoid problems with highway 
interdiction operations? Did the techniques result in unintended consequences? By 
policy, does your organization have any additional policy safeguards that have not 
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APPENDIX B. POLICY SAFEGUARD SCORING 
State Police 
Agencies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Audiovisual 
Recordings of 
Traffic Stops  




3 3 3 3 3 0 3 3 3 3 3 
Monthly 
Reviews  
  3 3 3   3 3   
Quarterly 
Reviews  
2      2   2  
Sporadic 
Reviews  
 1    1     1 





0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 3 
Review All 
Traffic Stops 






0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 
Points 8 7 15 12 12 7 17 12 12 11 10 
Percentage of 
Implementation 























0 0 3 3 0 3 0 3 3 0 3 
Points 9 6 12 12 6 9 6 12 12 9 12 
Percentage of 
Implementation 














0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Points 6 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Percentage of 
Implementation 




Vehicle Searches  
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
By Policy, Must 
Have at Least 
Reasonable 
Suspicion to ask 
for Consent  
0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 3 
Points 3 6 3 6 3 6 3 6 3 6 6 
Percentage of 
Implementation 
50 100 50 100 50 100 50 100 50 100 100 
Racial Statistical 
Data Collected by 

























0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Points 12 3 12 12 0 0 0 9 12 3 12 
Percentage of 
Implementation 
80 20 80 80 0 0 0 60 80 20 80 
Calculates Hit 
Rates of Personnel 
0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Established 
Criteria for 
Defining a Hit 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Separate 
Probable Cause 
and Consent for 
Hit Rates 










0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Percentage of 
Implementation 
0 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
Identified 
Procedure to Select 
Personnel 
0 3 3 3 3 0 3 3 3 3 3 
Over 3 Years  3 3    3     
2–3 Years     2  2  2 2 2  

















0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Additional Legal 
Courses 
3 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Probationary 
Period 
0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 
Points 7 9 15 14 10 5 12 11 11 11 10 
Percentage of 
Implementation 
33 43 71 67 48 24 57 52 52 52 48 
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